Moderadores: Mod. 2, Mod. 5, Mod. 1, Mod. 4, Mod. 3
La agencia de inteligencia estadounidense CIA acaba de abrir parcialmente sus archivos, por primera vez, sobre un proyecto ultrasecreto llevado a cabo durante la Guerra Fría para reflotar un submarino soviético en el océano Pacífico en 1974.
http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/2010/febrer ... 68984.html
A pesar de sus 949 paginas, si tuvieres tiempo (un mes)....se lee en un suspiroMarc Vidal escribió:Hay que ver...¡949 páginas!
The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.
The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified.
In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.
In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.
Fuente: La Tercera.Tiger Woods tendrá al FBI y al servicio secreto como escoltas
En su retorno a Augusta, el golfista tendrá seis agentes y un grupo de guardaespaldas encargados de su seguridad.
Noventa especializados guardias de seguridad, entre ellos personal del FBI y de los servicios secretos de inteligencia de Estados Unidos, tendrá la responsabilidad de custodiar a Tiger Woods durante su retorno al golf en el Masters de Augusta.
Cuando el campeón, acosado últimamente por escándalos sexuales, llegue mañana al Augusta National de Georgia será el hombre más fotografiado, observado y también vigilado de todo el mundo, según escribió el diario inglés Daily Mail.
La seguridad en el campo de juego estará a cargo de la firma Pinkerton, una empresa local que vigila las instalaciones con agentes uniformados y mantiene a raya a los espectadores.
La federación estadounidense de ese deporte (PGA), en coordinación con los organizadores del Masters, elaboró un plan confidencial para proteger a Woods especialmente, según detalló el rotativo, que incluirá un grupo de seis agentes especialmente encargados de su seguridad, así como un grupo de seis guardaespaldas y guardias privados.
Según revela el periódico británico, todos los encargados de su seguridad han recibido hasta fotos de las amantes del deportista para que eviten eventuales acercamientos de esas mujeres durante el torneo.
Usualmente el torneo cuenta con unos 200 guardias para mantener el orden en un torneo con 30 mil espectadores, pero este año cuentan con 80 más, dedicados a Woods exclusivamente.
http://dssa.dss.mil/counterintel/2009/DSS_Pub.pdfUnited States defense-related technologies and information are under attack: each day, every hour, and from multiple sources. The attack is pervasive, relentless, and unfortunately, at times successful. As a result, the United States' technical lead, competitive edge, and strategic military advantage are at risk; and our national security interests could be compromised. Defeating this attack requires knowledge of the threat and diligence on the part of all personnel charged with protecting classified information, to deter or neutralize its effect.
The Defense Security Service (DSS) works with defense industry to protect critical technologies and information. Defense contractors with access to classified material are required to identify and report suspicious contacts and potential collection attempts as mandated in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM). DSS publishes this annual report based on an analysis of suspicious contact reports (SCRs) that DSS considers indicative of efforts to target defense-related information.
Security officials, cleared defense contractors, intelligence professionals, and Department of Defense policy and decision makers can use information in this publication to assess the technology collection threat and develop and implement appropriate measures to mitigate its effect. DSS analysts examine information obtained from SCRs to identify the most frequently targeted technologies, assess the most common collection methods, explore possible motivations and affiliations of those attempting the collection, and identify the locations where these collection threats originate. If we are to be relevant and effective in defeating this threat, it is incumbent upon cleared defense contractors to report all incidents indicative of targeting. It is our hope that the information and analysis in this report will inform and encourage such reporting.
DSS encourages all Facility Security Officers to use the information in this report to supplement security awareness and education programs at their facilities. In addition to increasing threat awareness within the industrial base, robust training efforts contribute to additional SCRs and further contribute to the integrity of this analytical product. Timely submission of SCRs to DSS field offices is critical to an effective industrial security program.
