Buenos días. Ahora que dicen que Obama quiere negociar con los talibanes moderados (sic) conviene analizar dos documentos que pueden dar pistas sobre esta estrategia:
Talking with Insurgents: A Guide for the Perplexed
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/ ... byman.aspx
Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Washington Quarterly.
Extracto:
... RAND analyst Seth Jones points out that, in addition to foreign fighters, the insurgency in Afghanistan consists of Taliban members, Hezb-i-Islami, the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, local tribes, and criminal networks.15 Some of these factions would be difficult to talk with. Hizb-i-Islami, for example, has long been hostile toWestern influences, and the promises of its duplicitous leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, have little
value. Other components of the insurgency, however, are more promising.
Learning the demands of individual warlords and tribal leaders (as coalition forces have been doing in Iraq) is vital, as generic arrangements are unlikely to satisfy many particular commanders.
Creo que el fallo de este supuesto es que no se puede extrapolar el ejemplo de las tribus sunníes del \"awakening\" iraquí al modelo insurgente afgano. En Irak los aliados supieron explotar muy bien la sensibilidad nacionalista iraquí, más poderosa que el hecho religioso extremo, que es el que defienden los yihadistas extranjeros. Aparte del desprecio con que miran los iraquíes sunníes a ciertos extranjeros de las brigadas internacionales yihadistas y a sus métodos. Y aún más, lo que los americanos hicieron fue devolver a las tribus sunníes un poder político y fáctico que incluso Saddam respetó escrupulosamente. Ese modelo es difícil de exportar a Afganistán donde el hecho nacional no existe, sino que es un mosaico de tribus y de etnias irreconciliables. Para empeorarlo todo, la insurgencia iraquí tenía dudosos apoyos externos, mientras que la afgana tiene a medio Pakistán detrás...y parte de Irán haciendo de las suyas por el otro lado.
MI opinión es que es un modelo abocado al fracaso.
Otro trabajo excelente para conocer la insurgencia en Afganistán es de la corporación RAND
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf
Un pequeño adelanto, que tendría que estudiarse alguno en el Minisdef y en Moncloa:
Holding territory proved to be the most difficult facet of clear, hold, and expand in Afghanistan due to the low number of U.S. and local forces.6 This suggests that sufficient numbers of forces are needed to hold territory once it is cleared, or insurgents can retake it.
Deploying forces into insurgent areas can deny them sanctuary, interdict the border, and expand government and coalition presence. Where possible, U.S. counterinsurgency forces should be kept to a minimum and supported with civil-affairs and psychological operations units. A company of infantry can sometimes be provided for area patrolling and security for an immediate threat to the unit. Quick reaction forces in
the form of close air support assets or reinforcing units should back up the outposts whenever insurgent forces threatened to overrun them.
Clear, hold, and expand involves conducting operations in everincreasing zones around military bases. The first measure for force protection
is to target and eliminate the insurgents living within the inner zone—defined by mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time around their base. This requires living among the local population for long durations to gain trust and support and the ability to separate the locals
from the insurgents.
The secondary zone is the transit and support zone for the insurgents. It may include remote locations or areas where the population is neither friendly nor hostile to the counterinsurgency unit’s efforts. Occasional operations need to be conducted in these areas to show the flag and keep the population neutral to the idea of supporting the insurgents. In Afghanistan, battalion-sized sweeps and clearing operations by conventional forces generally reaped far less than their effort warranted because of the difficulty of finding and fixing elusive insurgents.7
Second is the development of an armed reconnaissance capability and a specialized raiding force. Armed reconnaissance is the patrolling of suspected insurgent areas to glean information on their activities, initiate contact, or confirm the area is clear. Armed reconnaissance can be accomplished with a variety of platforms and measures, such as AC-130 gunships (operating generally at night), tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, and mounted ground reconnaissance patrols.8 A specialized raiding force is sometimes required to conduct time-sensitive targeting
beyond the scope of conventional forces. These specialized raiding forces may consist of a counterterrorist unit, an indigenous strike
force, or a specially formed and trained unit drawn from organic forces.
In Afghanistan, raiding forces often required dedicated mobility platforms and a high level of access to intelligence assets. The sensor- toshooter
links often worked best when noncontributing layers of decisionmakers were removed.
