Mision FAS: Afganistán

[kilo009]

Pa habenos matao!!!

Las fuerzas de la OTAN en Afganistán (ISAF) han encontrado unos 2.500 objetos explosivos entre proyectiles de artillería, de mortero y cartuchos de un viejo depósito de municiones soviético cerca del aeropuerto de la ciudad afgana de Qala-i-Now, bajo responsabilidad del Equipo de Reconstrucción Provincial (PRT) español.

El equipo de la ISAF especializado en explosivos limpió la zona, unas 46 hectáreas, al emplear tres explosiones controladas y eliminar alrededor de unas trece minas antipersonas y aproximadamente 680 kilogramos de explosivos, según informa la ISAF. De este manera, consideran que se limpió de explosivos el área en el que próximamente se hará la obra para los cuarteles de las nuevas tropas del Ejército Nacional Afgano (ANA).

La Razón

[Xtra]

Por cierto, ímpresionantes imágenes de The New York Times sobre combates en Helmand:

http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2008/0 ... index.html

Hola:
Perdón por mi ignorancia en primer lugar, pero en las imágenes que se pueden ver en este enlace que nos manda kilo009, ¿que fusil están empuñando los soldados estadounidenses? No lo reconozco
Un saludo y perdón por mi ignorancia de nuevo.

[blackjack]

El fusa en primer plano es un M-4, lo de detrás es un Ametralladora ligera Minimi.

Hablando de armamento en Afganistan, Hay problemillas con las browning 12,70 de nuestras tropas en ZO, el polvo obliga a un mantenimiento más exaustivo de lo llevado hasta el momento.
Una interrupción en el momento menos oportuno.....

[Xtra]

El fusa en primer plano es un M-4, lo de detrás es un Ametralladora ligera Minimi.

Hablando de armamento en Afganistan, Hay problemillas con las browning 12,70 de nuestras tropas en ZO, el polvo obliga a un mantenimiento más exaustivo de lo llevado hasta el momento.
Una interrupción en el momento menos oportuno.....

Muchas gracias hombre , me parecía que era un M-4, pero no me había dado ni cuenta de lo de la Minimi Anda, ¡que menudo ojo de lince estoy hecho! Ja, ja,
Un saludo y gracias

[kilo009]

Cabe la posibilidad que en el nuevo encuentro entre Rice y Moratinos en Washington, la primera solicite a nuestro ministro de AAEE la aportación de Guardias Civiles y Policías Nacionales para formar a la Policía afgana.

Desde mi punto de vista no estaría nada mal una contribución en materia antiterrorista (GAR), información (SIGC) y control de masas, escolta (GRS) por parte de la GC a la Policía afgana. Especialmente son interesantes los métodos utilizados por el GAR en la lucha contraterrorista.

Y ahora unos artículos interesantes sobre el ANA:

Afghan army far from fighting fit
By Antonio Giustozzi

Over the past few years, the Afghan National Army (ANA) has often been presented as a success story. This certainly holds some truth, at least in comparison with Afghanistan's national police, which is widely seen as a complete failure.

The ANA is reasonably well behaved and quite popular throughout most of Afghanistan. Its initial difficulties in retaining troops within the ranks seem to have been addressed to some extent and both the desertion and absence-without-leave (AWOL) rates are down from the high levels of 2002-2006. AWOL rates in particular have declined dramatically over the past 18 months, to a relatively low 8%, from about 33% in 2006 [1].

This appears to be the combined result of a presidential decree turning AWOL into a crime, a widespread media campaign, rising unemployment and rising food prices, which force even less than enthusiastic recruits to stick to the ANA. The number of infantry battalions now stands at 36, while the army as a whole numbers 37,000 men; still substantially short of its personnel projections, but way above the 22,000 which it numbered at the end of summer 2007 [2].

These relative successes have turned the ANA into one of the pillars of the much touted "Afghanization" strategy. The term "Afghanization" itself is used with some ambiguity within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), sometimes implying a gradual withdrawal of foreign troops; at other times it implies the gradual shift of the weight of the fighting from the international contingents to the Afghans. A number of European countries seem to lean toward the first interpretation, while Washington clearly opts for the second [3].

Difficulties in operating independently
To the extent that Afghanization is meant to allow a withdrawal of foreign troops, the ANA still has several weaknesses. The main one is its extreme dependence on embedded trainers. Five years on, not a single battalion has graduated from the embedded training program, even though the original plan was for two years. A number of battalions, perhaps as many as 12, are considered to be led by sufficiently skilled officers capable of operating without advisers [4].

However, as the insurgency grew into a relatively large conflict through 2005-2007, the ANA has grown dependent on close air support, administered through the embedded training teams. The ANA does not have any personnel trained to handle close air support, nor does it seem bound to develop such skills in the foreseeable future [5].

The fighting tactics that ANA officers have been learning from their trainers are largely based on American tactics; the infantry's main task is to force the enemy to reveal itself, allowing the air force to wipe it out with air strikes. There is little evidence that ANA units would be able to control the battlefield without such air support, or that they are learning the necessary skills.

The ability of the ANA and the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) to plan and conduct complex operations on their own has not yet been tested; the few autonomous operations carried out by ANA units are simple ones, usually with backup from foreign units and always with the embedded trainers present [6].

Tight international sponsoring of the ANA also means it is usually not operating in very small units, which would be most effective in engaging and pursuing the insurgents in the absence of overwhelming air support. Usually the task of engaging the insurgents in close combat is left to the special forces of various foreign contingents. Several ANA officers complain about the fact that the training received by the infantry battalions is too "conventional" [7]. By not practicing effective counter-guerrilla tactics, the necessary skills are not being developed, and it will not be possible to rapidly produce such skills in the event of a substantial change in the involvement of foreign troops in the war.

Another dubious aspect of Afghanization is the limited logistical capabilities of the ANA. Although its logistical units are now being developed, the ANA's difficulties in recruiting skilled staff casts some doubts about the future efficiency of its logistics once the foreign contingents hand over these responsibilities to the ANA.

Ethnic fault lines
With regard to its long-term viability, another problematic aspect of the ANA is represented by its internal ethnic fault lines. Since 2005, both the MoD and the Americans have securely guarded any data about the ethnic composition of the ANA, but there is evidence that a genuine ethnic balance has not yet been achieved; even more worryingly, although a point was initially made that units would be ethnically mixed, it is now obvious that they are not.

Tajiks are still overrepresented, particularly in the officer corps. According to one estimate, 70% of the battalion commanders are Tajiks [8]. This figure is in stark contrast with the Afghan army of the pre-war period, where the overwhelming majority of field officers were Pashtuns and ethnic minorities were mainly relegated to logistics and administration.

Recruitment to the army is not going well in a number of Pashtun regions affected by the insurgency, mainly because of a campaign of intimidation carried out by insurgents against the families of soldiers, which discourages potential recruits from joining and has forced a number of soldiers not to re-enlist. The situation is compounded by the habit of the MoD to deploy only predominantly Tajik units to the war zones of the south and southeast, presumably to avoid the risk of "fraternization" and to enhance the cohesion of the units. As a result, very few Pashtuns are fighting against the insurgency within the ranks of the ANA.

Although friction between ANA units and the local population or even between ANA and locally recruited police is reported, there is no evidence that this is a driving factor in the insurgency. However, such friction and the fact that many soldiers and officers do not speak Pashto must certainly limit the cooperation that these units are able to enlist locally, particularly in remote rural areas. Even the few Pashtuns who serve in these units are usually not from the region where they are deployed, but from other Pashtun-populated regions. Therefore, they lack local knowledge, even if they can understand the language spoken by the villagers.

These characteristics of the ANA units deployed in the south, southeast and east are compounded by the unreliability and ineffectiveness of the police, which in principle should contribute local knowledge to the counter-insurgency effort. Locally recruited police forces are more often than not militias in disguise, which fight for their own agenda and are locked in local rivalries. These forces do not effectively cooperate with the ANA and are not reliable sources of information [9].

Perhaps more relevant in the long term is the risk of ethnic tension compromising the unity of the ANA, once foreign troops have been withdrawn or their presence substantially reduced. Given battalions which are largely ethnically homogeneous and with many within the officer corps having a background in ethnically-based political factions, the stage seems set for serious trouble in the event of a foreign withdrawal. Moreover, the army, whose size is now planned at 80,000 but may grow further, is already unaffordable for the revenue-stripped Afghan state and will one day have to be downsized, raising the prospect of serious disgruntlement among officers.

Conclusion
At some point ISAF will have to allow the ANA to be tested on the battlefield in conditions resembling those which it will meet in the event of a withdrawal of foreign forces. Apart from being a test of Afghanization, such a trial - if successfully passed - would also enhance the credibility of the ANA and the legitimacy of the government, as well as increase the leverage of Kabul in any negotiations with the Taliban.

The test could, for example, consist of leaving the ANA alone to manage a province or region without external support. The fact that such a test has not been attempted yet in more than six years of international tutoring might reflect a relative lack of confidence in the capabilities of the ANA, or the fear of the political consequences of a failure.

Notes
1. Stars and Stripes, Mideast edition, May 8, 2007; Video Teleconference with Major General Robert W. Cone - Commander of CSTC-A (Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan), March 26, 2008.
2. American Forces Press Service, April 7.
3. Author's personal communications with diplomats in Kabul, April 2008.
4. A. Giustozzi, "Reconstructing the Defense Sector," Chapter in Deconstructing the Afghan Security Sector, LIT Verlag Security, 2008; A. Giustozzi, "Auxiliary force or national army? Afghanistan's ANA and the counter-insurgency effort, 2002-2006," Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18(1), March 2007, pp 45-67.
5. Author's personal communication with a senior American officer and a NATO diplomat, Kabul, April 2008.
6. Author's personal communication with British army officers and journalists, London, November 2007; personal communication with military attache, Kabul, October 2007.
7. Author's personal communication with military attache, Kabul, April 2008.
8. Author's personal communication with UN official, Kabul, April 2008.
9. Author's personal communication with British, Dutch and American officers and diplomats, 2007-2008; personal communication with senior Ministry of the Interior official, Kabul, October 2007.

(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation . Used with permission.)

(Copyright 2008 The Jamestown Foundation.)

4 Antonov An-32 para el ANA Air Corps:

Afghanistan receives US-acquired An-32 transports
By Craig Hoyle

The Afghan National Army Air Corps has received its first two of four Antonov An-32 transports acquired through the US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) under a unique Foreign Military Sales arrangement.

Purchased from commercial sources in Kiev, Ukraine, following technical inspections completed by navy personnel, the newly acquired aircraft form part of an initiative intended to provide Afghanistan’s armed forces with a credible aviation component as part of NATO-led reconstruction effort inside the country.

Afghanistan’s existing An-32 inventory has operated since 1989 with no logistics support infrastructure, according to NAVAIR, which has also purchased support systems for the nation’s latest aircraft.

The An-32s “met the required specifications and were in excellent condition,” according to NAVAIR, which moved from project approval to first deliveries inside 14 weeks.

“With this An-32 buy, the team got to see the entire process happen in front of their eyes in a little more than 60 days,” says Capt James Wallace, programme manager for the navy’s support and commercial derivative aircraft programme office.

[kilo009]

Miembros del KSK tuvieron la oportunidad de detener o matar a un importante líder talibán y no lo hicieron porque el Gobierno alemán no les dió autorización para utilizar la fuerza.

Para quien quiera leer como fue la operación:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 33,00.html

[kilo009]

Vamos a actualizar el tema afgano:

-La República Checa, con su última contribución, aporta a la ISAF unos 350 militares.

-En Noruega se han difundido unas fotografías y un libro sobre la participación de los Jaeger Kommando, Marine Jaeger Kommando y JTF2, dentro de la TF K-Bar, que operó en Afganistán en Octubre de 2001 en adelante (hasta marzo de 2002) junto a KSK alemán, fuerzas especiales danesas, turcas, SEAL, Special Warfare Combatant-craft crewmen, U.S. Army Special Forces, U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers y miembros de los SAS de Nueva Zelanda y Australia.

Task Force K-BAR was the driving force behind myriad combat operations. These extremely high-risk missions set a powerful precedent, and included search and rescue; recovery dive operations; boardings of high-interest, non-compliant vessels; special reconnaissance; sensitive site exploitation; direct action; hydrographic reconnaissance; destruction of multiple cave and tunnel complexes; apprehension of military and political detainees; identification and destruction of Al Qaeda training camps; explosion of thousands of pounds of enemy ordnance; and successful coordination of unconventional warfare operations for Afghanistan.

-El Senado americano aprueba $168 billion para Iraq y Afganistán http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/05/d ... plemental/

Y por último un gráfico:



La fuente de todo esto es http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/

[ZULU]

Defensa se gastó 14 millones en cuatro aviones ‘espía’ para Afganistán que no funcionan

http://www.elconfidencial.com/cache/200 ... ionan.html

[kilo009]

Las Fuerzas Armadas canadienses han creado una Unidad de Inteligencia, básicamente dedicada a HUMINT, para operar en Afganistán (Kandahar).

Por el momento se conoce que han empleado unos 27 millones de $ para financiar el equipo de la Unidad.

Son muy interesantes este tipo de Unidades, tal como las ha planteado el Reino Unido o Canadá, para operar en países donde nuestras fuerzas armadas vayan a estar desplegadas, donde básicamente nos vamos a tener que ver las caras contra formas no convencionales de hacer la guerra, utilizando métodos terroristas, es el caso actualmente de Líbano o Afganistán, y se dió en Iraq y en menor medida en Bosnia y Kosovo.

Para las fuerzas militares creo además que es mucho más difícil un despliegue de este tipo, porque implica estar sobre el terreno muy poco tiempo antes de que las fuerzas entren en el territorio hostil, y la capacidad de información ahí sería muy pequeña. Caso diferente es el del CNI por ejemplo, que normalmente ya tiene antenas en la zona.

Lo ideal sería que si estamos dentro de una lucha contraterrorista global, y que dentro de esta guerra las FAS tienen unos cometidos preferentes, las UOE's en particular, se prevea el envio anticipado de equipos HUMINT a posibles zonas de operaciones, equipos integrados culturalmente (idioma, costumbres...). El modelo británico en este caso es muy bueno.

[kilo009]

Esto nos afecta a nosotros, ya que Italia va a distribuir de forma diferente su contingente en Afganistán (especialmente en Kabul):

-Sacará del país entre 250-300 militares
-Se preparan para poder operar contra los talibanes en el sur
-Emplearán de forma más activos procedimientos aerotransportados para dar una mayor flexibilidad (¿más helicópteros?)

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26624061.htm