Mision FAS: Afganistán

[Esteban]

Y una noticia más; por lo visto hubo un plan para atentar contra el ministro alemán de Defensa de visita a Kabul. Sobre todo tras la detención de unos sospechosos en la frontera entre Iran y Paquistan con pasaportes alemanes; Alemania, como España están directamente amenazados por al Qaeda por tener fuerzas desplegadas en tierras musulmanas. Recordemos el vídeo aquél en que amenazaban a Austria, Alemania...y España. Después de lo que ha pasado hoy en el Líbano, espero que todo el mundo se apriete los machos.

Attack plotted against German minister in Afghan
(AFP)

24 June 2007

BERLIN - German authorities learned of a plot to attack Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung when he visited Afghanistan earlier this month, the Bild am Sonntag newspaper reported.

Jung visited German troops in northern Afghanistan on June 6 but the trip was not officially announced for security reasons.

The German intelligence services warned of the plot just before the minister landed near Kabul, Bild said, citing the defence ministry and sources close to the intelligence community.

‘The tip-off about a planned attack was very clear,’ the defence ministry is quoted as telling the newspaper. As a result, the German army changed Jung’s travel plans. Germany has around 3,000 troops in Afghanistan serving under NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), most of them in the relatively calm north of the country.

On May 19, a suicide bomb killed three German soldiers and six civilians in a crowded market in the town of Kunduz, 300 kilometres (190 miles) north of Kabul, in Germany’s biggest loss in Afghanistan since 2003.

A few days after Jung’s visit, a newspaper said a foreign office report had warned that more attacks on German troops were to be expected.

[Esteban]

Consecuencia del atentado en Líbano: los 50 instructores para Afganistán de momento se quedan en casa. Se ha retirado del orden del día de la Comisión de Defensa la solicitud de autorización para su envío. Sale mañana en ELPAIS. Seguro que los aliados afganos nos lo agradecen profundamente. Otro compromiso que queda en palabras.

[Esteban]

Sobre los EFP detectados en Afganistán:

Afghan EFPs: Home Made?
By David Hambling June 15, 2007

Explosively Formed Penetrators -- so-called "superbombs" -- used to be rare. But they're spreading fast, reportedly being found in Kabul for the first time this week.

Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah was recently killed in Afghanistan. A few weeks earlier he had given an interview to al-Jazeera. But what caught my eye was the story's photo (see left), with the accompanying text:



"A cameraman attached to Bays' team was taken to a separate area where the Taliban showed him a store-room of explosives, which were in the process of being converted into anti-tank bombs."

Obviously they use improvised explosive devices against vehicles in Afghanistan the whole time. But the use of the term 'anti-tank bomb' and the picture made me wonder whether EFP technology -- bombs firing an aerodynamic slug capable of destroying armored vehicles -- might be involved.

I concluded it was probably nothing. The mine they are working on looks like an Italian anti-tank TC-6, which is already well-known in Afghanistan. It's a weapon which works by sheer blast power. Could you turn one into an EFP by adding a copper disc which would become a projectile? Sheer speculation...

Now we get this from the BBC: "Sophisticated bomb found in Kabul."

A hi-tech bomb, similar to the ones used by militants in Iraq, has been found in the Afghan capital, Kabul. Afghan intelligence sources say the bomb can penetrate heavily armoured vehicles and was set up by a road to target a high-level government convoy.

Clearly, EFPs are now part of the war in Afghanistan, too. Where did they come from? It's far from clear. Take this Jane's news story on EFPs in Iraq, which notes the repeated claims that the bombs were made in Iran -- and then observes that, even if some components may have come across the border in the beginning,

"the knowledge required to manufacture and use EFPs may have become so widespread that Iranian assistance is no longer required."

Indeed, the know-how -- all bomb-making know-how seems to be spreading. There may not even be any physical transfer of components. Al-Qaeda and other terror groups have long shown an appreciation of the power of the Internet; designs and "recipes" are likely passed between groups online. The possibility that simple but effective techniques might spread in this way is alarming, as it gives terrorists a major boost in their arms race against countermeasures.

Is terror technology the ultimate Internet virus?

http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/06/s ... _hit_.html

Novedades en Afganistán; dos soldados ISAF KIA en Kabul por atentado con coche bomba, y dos contratistas de seguridad KIA por un terrorista suicida que atacó su convoy cuando se dirigían a la que será la nueva prisión para presos excedentes de Gitmo.

La novedad de los contratistas muertos (1 USA, 1 Nepalí)..es que el primero era una mujer

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6247940.stm

[Loopster]

Amplias probabilidades de que la mujer muerta sea la misma de la foto que posteé en el Militaryphotos.net

[Esteban]

Pon el enlace si lo tienes por ahí y cuenta algo más,.

[Loopster]

Pues en el MP.net alguien preguntó por mujeres en las PMCs y uno de los usuarios italianos puso a una compatriota suya, que es instructora y a la que los BTDT (Been There, Done That) del foro rapidamente calificaron de chupatintas enclaustrada en las FOB sin un papel activo dentro de la tribu.

El post en Militaryphotos: http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... ight=Woman

El caso es que yo solo he contado a 4 mujeres metidas en PMCs, la famosa australiana ex Policia Militar, la italiana esta, una rubia en Afganistán y otra (o la misma) en Afganistán también, que apareció durante el ataque a un convoy de la embajada americana, cargando toda la impedimenta de combate.

La primera


La segunda (o la misma)


En otras ocasiones se ha tomado por miembros de PMCs a agentes del DSS (Seguridad Diplomática) o especialistas del FBI, pero vamos... con los dedos de una mano y nos sobran un par. Otra cosa es el número de mujeres metidas en Intel privada, Diligence, Abraxas, CACI, SAIC... todas han colgado en algún momento perfiles HUMINT o de traductores especificando que buscaban mujeres.

Voy a ver si se comenta algo por los foros de contratistas, o si publica algo en estos dias icasualty, pero dudo que sepamos nada de esta mujer (y cuanto menos se sepa más claro está que de escolta nada, más bien otra profesión).

[Esteban]

Más sobre los EFP. No son las cargas huecas al uso, que dependen para su penetración de lo que se llama "distancia de stand-off", lo que explica la presencia de todas esas sondas y "narices" en proyectiles HEAT y misiles C/C de segunda generación. El problema con las EFP es que es capaz de proyectar ese chorro de calor y metal fundido que penetra el blindaje a distancias superiores a lo que son los tradicionales stand-off.

Eso en manos terroristas significa que pueden colocar las cargas con mayor impunidad y letalidad. Y aquí no hay V-shapped chásis que te salve. Esto es un tema puro y duro de blindaje y contrablindaje..y no hay inhibidor que te libre si el mecanismo es alternativo a la radiofrecuencia.

Esperemos que los BMR no tengan que encontrarse con esta amenaza.

Clarifying EFPs and Shaped Charges
In response to yesterday's query, we got several helpful clarifications. Below I've quoted an excellent breakdown of the differences by David Hambling (author of Weapons Grade...) Thanks also to Joshua Foust at Registan.

The bottom line is that EFPs are a specific type of shaped charge that is new to Afghanistan; they have less penetrating capability but with much greater range, which makes them very difficult to defend against. It's one thing to protect against a mine that only blows up when you go over it, and another thing entirely when that weapon can be concealed alongside the road. They newly introduced mines are not difficult to make once you know the specifications.

While in the same general class, EFPs are distinct from normal shaped charges. MORE

A standard shaped charge is hollow cone lined with metal (usually copper); then the explosive detonates, the metal is formed into a very narrow jet moving at several thpusand metres per second. This has excellent armor-piercing properties, usually quoted as being up to six times the diameter of the charge, but a very limited range (the jet loses focus after a metre or so).

By contrast, an EFP is a very shallow cone lined with metal. Detonation produces a single aerodynamic slug which is relatively slow and has much less penetration ability (approximately the same as the charge diameter), but the slug has an effective range of tens of metres or more. This makes it very dangerous as an 'off route' mine which can be placed beside a road.

The recent EFP find in Kabul appears to mark the introduction of a new weapon into Afghanistan.

My personal view is that while EFP technology may or may not be coming from Iran, you certainly don't need advanced technology to make them. Once you have a workable 'recipe' and know the size, exact shape and grade of metal needed, it can be copied by anyone with workshop facilities.

http://thecenturyfoundation.typepad.com ... .html#more

[kilo009]

Me imagino que parte de esos 50 habrán volado para Líbano de inmediato por si las cosas se ponen fea, o como mínimo están aquí en alerta.

[Esteban]

Qué va. Quedan en España en "stand by" a la espera de que el ministro considere oportuno pedir permiso al Parlamento.

[elder]

¿Pero estos 50 instructores los mandábamos a iniciativa nuestra? Lo dudo.
Es decir, se supone que formarían parte de una unidad más amplia de instructores, que ahora habrá quedado coja.