Mision FAS: Libano
Moderadores: Mod. 4, Mod. 5, Mod. 3, Mod. 2, Mod. 1
ELECONOMISTA analiza ambos atentados. También recogen la pista siria.
http://www.eleconomista.es/economia/not ... spana.htmlAtaques en Yemen y Líbano: ¿están los intereses españoles en el punto de mira?
Enrique Montánchez | 19:37 - 9/07/2007
El atentado del Líbano, un aviso para los intereses españoles en el mundo (26/06) Ningún país occidental ostenta el triste récord sufrido por España de dos atentados terroristas en Oriente Medio en los que, separados por apenas nueve días, han muerto seis militares y siete civiles. Se trata de algo más que una coincidencia, que el Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) trata de desentrañar.
No le basta con atribuir ambos hechos al terrorismo islamista o colocarles la socorrida etiqueta de Al Qaeda, según apuntan medios cercanos al servicio secreto español.
Un gran reto
El CNI afronta el mayor reto de su corta historia: garantizar la seguridad de los intereses españoles en el mundo y, específicamente, los económicos, que convierten a España en la octava potencia. De no estar a la altura de la confianza depositada por las instituciones y de los enormes medios humanos y materiales puestos a su servicio, habría que plantearse si la reconversión del Cesid en el CNI ha sido baldía.
Desde estas páginas se informó de que la emboscada del 24 de junio contra un convoy militar español en el Líbano reunía evidencias suficientes para pensar en una operación inspirada por servicios secretos. Coche bomba accionado por mando remoto, lo que ponía de manifiesto que los autores sabían que los BMR españoles no disponían de inhibidores de frecuencia; matrícula falsa; número de bastidor trucado; explosivo C-4 de tipo militar, y plan de escape estudiado al detalle. En suma, una operación profesional.
Las declaraciones del ministro de Defensa, José Antonio Alonso, han sido bastante elocuentes. Por dos veces, una en Beirut y otra ante la Comisión de Defensa del Parlamento, afirmó que el coche fue preparado fuera del Líbano. Pero, sin pruebas, se cuidó de señalar a un país concreto para evitar un conflicto diplomático.
Siria, bajo sospecha
En medios cercanos al CNI no se descartó la larga mano de los servicios secretos sirios. Está pendiente que el Gobierno informe si los 50 kilos de C-4 empleados contra los militares españoles responden al tipo utilizado en atentados con coches bomba contra políticos libaneses que, según el Gobierno del país de los cedros, llevaban el sello de los servicios especiales de Damasco. Aun en el caso de que el explosivo no condujera a pista alguna, el CNI sigue investigando una posible "conexión siria".
No ha pasado desapercibido para los analistas que las buenas relaciones hispano-sirias se han enfriado súbitamente a raíz de que la Policía española detuviese en Barajas, a petición de EEUU, al sirio y presunto traficante de armas Monzer Al Kassar, residente en Marbella, foco de operaciones de blanqueo de capitales. Washington ha solicitado su extradición y, si se le concede, le esperan largos años en cárceles estadounidenses. En la movida biografía de Al Kassar figura haber colaborado con servicios secretos de medio mundo, entre ellos el antiguo Cesid.
No hay antecedentes
En el caso del atentado de Yemen confluyen elementos, cuanto menos, singulares, a juicio de las citadas fuentes. No hay antecedentes en ese país de una operación de estas características por parte de organizaciones yihadistas. Las primeras investigaciones del CNI se centran en determinar si se trata de un ataque contra turistas en general, preludio de otros más, o han elegido específicamente al grupo español.
En este caso, la situación sería preocupante y afectaría de lleno a los intereses empresariales de nuestro país en el Golfo Pérsico. Así, el atentado en el que han sido asesinados siete españoles habría sido ordenado directamente por el "directorio" de Al Qaeda -la cúpula ejecutiva que se estructura en divisiones: económica, militar, religiosa, propaganda- no sería producto de una acción individual de cualquier grupo franquiciado por la organización.
La orden habría partido del grupo saudí del "directorio", vinculado a la gestión de los recursos económicos y empresariales. Recuérdese que Osama Bin Laden es saudí y su grupo de empresas -entre ellas Bin Laden Group- se ramifica por todo Oriente Medio, Europa y Asia.
La pregunta es: ¿qué intereses económicos españoles han entrado en colisión con la red económica de Bin Laden para merecer una respuesta tan sanguinaria, materializada en asesinar a ciudadanos indefensos? Analistas expertos en Inteligencia Económica indican que determinadas inversiones españolas en los países ribereños de la península Arábiga no han entrado en los canales controlados por familias saudíes radicales.
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
al Zawahiri se congratula del ataque a los cascos azules en Líbano
Zawahri Praises Attack on UNIFIL Troops
Al-Qaida's No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahri has hailed a car bomb attack on U.N. peacekeepers in southern Lebanon that killed six soldiers last month.
"This operation... came as a response against those invading Crusader forces who were occupying a beloved part of the land of Islam," Zawahri said in an audio recording posted on an Internet website often used by Islamic militants.
The peacekeepers - three Spaniards and three Colombians - serving in a Spanish-led contingent, were killed when the car bomb struck their armored personnel carrier along the main road between Khiam and Marjayoun on June 24.
The bombing was the first deadly attack on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since last year's Israel-Hizbullah war.
Spain has deployed nearly 1,100 troops to southeastern Lebanon as part of UNIFIL, which has a total of 13,225 soldiers from 30 countries.
Zawahri also urged Hamas in the Palestinian territories to wage jihad against Israel and called on Muslims in Pakistan to resist their "corrupt" president, Pervez Musharraf, by offering moral and financial support to militants in neighboring Afghanistan.
He said al-Qaida is preparing a "precise response" to Britain's decision to bestow a knighthood on author Salman Rushdie.
"I say to (Britain's Queen) Elizabeth and (former British Prime Minister Tony) Blair that your message has reached us and we are in the process of preparing for you a precise response," Zawahri said in the audiotape.(AFP-Naharnet)
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
La revista TIME recoge la información de los contactos entre Hizbollah y UNIFIL
Wednesday, Jul. 11, 2007
Peacekeeping with Hizballah's Help
By Nicholas Blanford/Naqoura, South Lebanon
After the war in south Lebanon last summer, the small United Nations peacekeeping mission here was bolstered by the arrival of thousands of crack European troops determined to keep Hizballah fighters away from the border with Israel. A year on, however, and some of those same European contingents are now seeking the cooperation of the Iran-backed Hizballah to help protect them from Al-Qaeda-inspired militants.
The contingents comprising the peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL have good cause for concern. Last month, six Spanish and Colombian UNIFIL soldiers were killed in a bomb ambush, the deadliest attack against the peacekeeping mission in its 29-year history. In a video message released this week, Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri hailed the attack as "a response against those invading Crusader forces who were occupying a beloved part of the land of Islam". And, UNIFIL officials fear, given the worsening security situation in Lebanon, there could be more attacks on the way. "The major difficulty we are going to face for sure is this kind of terrorist attack because even if we have no idea yet who could be the perpetrators... another attack can come," Major General Claudio Graziano, UNIFIL's commander, told TIME in an interview at his headquarters in the southern coastal village of Naqoura.
Indeed, the deadly bombing and the threat of further attacks has cast a shadow over an otherwise successful year for UNIFIL. From 2,000 armed observers last summer, UNIFIL today stands at some 13,500 troops drawn from 30 nations, including European heavyweights such as France, Italy and Spain. It even includes a naval component to prevent arms being smuggled into Lebanon by sea. UNIFIL's mandate is to assist the Lebanese army in securing Lebanon's volatile southern frontier in accordance with U.N. Resolution 1701, which helped end last summer's 34-day war. "The mission has been, by and large, highly successful... because not only has it been the quietest time in the last 40 years maybe [along the Lebanon-Israel border] but what's more we have accomplished many points of 1701," the Italian general said, citing the near absence of cross-border violence.
Hizballah grudgingly accepted Resolution 1701 at the end of the war and redeployed its fighters and military hardware north of the border district. "Here, [Hizballah] are not moving anything during the night or during the day," Graziano said "We have 400 patrols [a day] and 150 permanent observation posts, so it's not easy for them."
With Hizballah adopting a low profile, UNIFIL has closely eyed the growing threat in Lebanon posed by groups inspired by Al-Qaeda. Graziano admitted that UNIFIL regularly receives warnings of imminent attacks, but "the level of credibility of the warning is not always very high". There was no prior warning, however, to the June 24 car bomb attack against an armored patrol of Spanish peacekeepers. The remote-controlled explosion knocked an armored personnel carrier (APC) off the road, killing six soldiers in what a Western military officer familiar with the investigation said was an "extraordinarily sophisticated" operation.
No claim of responsibility for the attack has been made, although Spanish intelligence officials reportedly are pointing the finger at three Sunni jihadist groups, linked to Al-Qaeda, based in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The military officer said that the operation would have required weeks if not months of planning by a highly skilled team. "Incredibly detailed planning went into this," the officer told TIME on strict condition of anonymity. The bomb was approximately 220 pounds, with the blast directed laterally against the targeted APC.
Sources tell TIME that, since the attack, there have been discreet contacts between some UNIFIL contingents and Hizballah representatives. UNIFIL is supposed to confine liaison to the Lebanese army, and Graziano said that direct contacts between UNIFIL troops and Hizballah, or any other Lebanese political party, was "highly forbidden". But keeping some type of contact may be critical to UNIFIL's mission.
The goal of the informal communications is partly to harness Hizballah's local intelligence gathering abilities, but also to ensure that the powerful Shi'ite group remains supportive of UNIFIL. The unspoken fear among some peacekeepers is that although Hizballah strongly denounced the bombing, it may have known of the attack beforehand or may even have been involved, which, if true, would have dire repercussions on UNIFIL's future. "I cannot dismiss that at a national level there is a diplomatic relation [between troop contributing states and Hizballah] but that has nothing to do with the United Nations," Graziano said. "If somebody [in UNIFIL] does have a relation [with Hizballah] it's against my will."
Nonetheless, a Hizballah official in south Lebanon confirmed to TIME that there was at least one meeting between Spanish UNIFIL officers and Hizballah representatives after the bomb attack. Furthermore, Hizballah officials have met with Spanish diplomats in Beirut and the Madrid government is believed to have held talks with Iran, Hizballah's patron, on the safety of its peacekeepers. At least one other European contingent enjoys regular direct contact with Hizballah, finessing Graziano's order by using a civilian advisor who was hired outside the UNIFIL framework.
Graziano said that the heightened risk of attack has not affected performance, but he said he has asked the U.N. for additional "intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets," suggesting a need to enhance UNIFIL's security as much as improving its ability to carry out the mandate. Graziano said he wants cameras and thermal imaging equipment to watch over UNIFIL bases, the border and remote areas, freeing up troops for force protection and rapid reaction duties. He even hopes to receive reconnaissance drones.
The French battalion is equipped with pilotless drones, although they have not been employed due to objections by Hizballah, which suspects that any intelligence gathered by UNIFIL's drones could fall into the hands of its enemies. "I would like to have this [drone] capability, but just for protection of our units and not for gathering information," Graziano said.
But until the U.N. greenlights the new surveillance equipment, UNIFIL had better ensure it maintains good relations with Hizballah.
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
Un pequeño flashback
Fath Al-Islam, Al-Qaeda, Syria Liaison Captured
Knowledgeable sources in Lebanon have reported that interrogations of Fath Al-Islam detainees have shown that one, a man called Ahmad Mar'i, served as a link between Syrian intelligence, Al-Qaeda, and the Fath Al-Islam organization.
According to the sources, Mar'i smuggled fighters from Syria into the Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp under the supervision of Syrian intelligence.
His brother Muhammad Mar'i acknowledged during questioning that his brother had told him of terror operations being planned by Fath Al-Islam, including a bombing against UNIFIL in Lebanon. He also said that Fath Al-Islam's supreme commander who is planning and funding the operations is "Abu Talha," a Saudi who arrived in Lebanon occasionally to convey instructions and funds to the organization and then returned to Iraq via Syria.
Sources: Al-Mustaqbal, Lebanon, June 8, 2007; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, London, June 9, 2007
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
Noticia FLASH de naharnet.com
AMPLIANDOA bomb blast targeted a UNIFIL patrol in Qassmiyeh near the southern port city of Tyre, local TV stations reported. The National News Agency said, however, that a small explosion went off near a permanent UNIFIL checkpoint in Qassmiyeh, causing material damage. No casualties were reported.
Bomb Targets UNIFIL Again
A roadside bomb targeted a UNIFIL patrol on Qassmiyeh bridge near the southern port city of Tyre on Monday, the second such attack on the peacekeeping force in less than a month.
UNIFIL spokeswoman Yasmina Bouziane confirmed the attack on the vehicle belonging to the Tanzanian contingent. She said no casualties were reported in the blast.
"We can confirm that an explosion occurred in the area of Qassmiyeh Bridge and it involved one UNIFIL military police vehicle," she said in a statement. "A UNIFIL investigation team has been dispatched to the location and the Lebanese Army is on the spot as well."
"Now, no casualties have been reported - only damages to the vehicle," she said.
The Lebanese army immediately cordoned off the area and diverted traffic from the bridge.
In the first attack targeting the U.N. force, six peacekeepers belonging to the Spanish contingent were killed June 24 when a bomb struck their armored personnel carrier on the Marjayoun-Khiam road in the south.
Beirut, 16 Jul 07, 12:26
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
-
KS
Posible detención relacionada con ataque a tanzanos de UNIFIL:
- El servicio de inteligencia del ejército libanés ha detenido a 10 "inmigrantes ilegales de origen árabe", en la localidad de Tiro, donde se produjo el atentado contra el vehículo tanzano de UNIFIL.
- La detención se produjo el lunes por la noche, el mismo día del atentado, mientras dormían en un edificio de apartamentos todavía en construcción.
- Los detenidos son 8 sudaneses y 2 iraquíes.
- Las autoridades no quisieron relacionarlo directamente con el atentado.
Fuente:
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp ... e_id=83905
____________________________
Hezbolá y AMAL han condenado los atentados contra UNIFIL:
Fuente:
http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsD ... 1A0039557C
Un saludo,
KS
- El servicio de inteligencia del ejército libanés ha detenido a 10 "inmigrantes ilegales de origen árabe", en la localidad de Tiro, donde se produjo el atentado contra el vehículo tanzano de UNIFIL.
- La detención se produjo el lunes por la noche, el mismo día del atentado, mientras dormían en un edificio de apartamentos todavía en construcción.
- Los detenidos son 8 sudaneses y 2 iraquíes.
- Las autoridades no quisieron relacionarlo directamente con el atentado.
Fuente:
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp ... e_id=83905
____________________________
Hezbolá y AMAL han condenado los atentados contra UNIFIL:
Fuente:
http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsD ... 1A0039557C
Un saludo,
KS
después de las últimas pruebas encontradas contra el Frente de Liberación Popular de Palestina-Comando General en recientes atentados contra políticos libaneses y la detención de activistas en dicho país, crecen las sospechas sobre la implicación de este grupo, uno de los más prosirios, en la campaña contra UNIFIL.
http://counterterrorismblog.org/July 18, 2007
What is FPLP-GC up to in Lebanon?
By Olivier Guitta
While there was a second attack on the UNIFIL soldiers in Southern Lebanon and Hezbollah is playing dumb, not knowing who is behind the attacks.
This is all the more surprising that Hezbollah is still very much in charge of the south and literally nothing happens without it being aware of it.
Another pro-Syrian terrorist group could be behind these attacks: the FPLP-GC.
What is FPLP-GC up to?
The Croissant partially answered this question:
Lebanese fear that Syria ordered its agents in Lebanon, in particular Fatah Intifada [FI] and Ahmed Jibril’s FPLP-GC, to start a third front [after Nahr el Bared (Northern Lebanon) and Ain Al Helwi (Southern Lebanon)] against the Lebanese army, around Qosaya in Eastern Bekaa [Southern Lebanon].
This was done in response to the failure of the second front.
In fact, Lebanese authorities fear that the failure of Jund Al Sham to open a new front in Ain El Helwi will push FPLP-GC and its new recruits to enter the arena
- this all the more since Fatah and other PLO factions are very present in Ain El Helwi, contrary to Nahr el Bared where they were totally crushed by the Syrian army in the mid-80’s; they could rein in Jund Al Sham and thus prevent total unrest inside the camp.
Also, Beirut takes very seriously the information relating to the offensive apparatus put in place by the Palestinian bases located on the border with Syria:
In Qosaya, the FPLP-GC has welcomed in its ranks fighters from the “Al Yarmuk brigade”; the latter is based in Syria and is part of the Army of Liberation of Palestine.
Finally, in the same area, i.e. between Halwa and Wadi Al Anbar, on June 4, Lebanese security forces arrested eight Iraqi, Syrians and Sudanese citizens along with their guide; they were trying to clandestinely join the Palestinian camps. Finally last month, 15 other foreign fighters were arrested in this area.
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
Según Naharnet, hay cada vez mayores pruebas de la relación de Fatah al Islam con la inteligencia siria, a través del cuñado de Assad.
Por otra parte, según el barómetro del periódico económico EXPANSION, el 44% de los españoles se muestran a favor de la retirada de las tropas de Líbano, mientras un 41% se muestra partidario de que permanezcan "siempre que se aumenten sus medidas de protección".Report: Fatah al-Islam Linked to Bashar Assad's Brother-in-Law
An alleged leader of the Fatah al-Islam terrorist network has testified to interrogators that the group is linked to the head of Syria's intelligence apparatus Maj. Gen. Assef Shawkat, the brother-in-law of President Bashar Assad.
Ahmed Merie, a Lebanese citizen arrested late in May at a Beirut hotel, also testified to military examining magistrate Rashid Mezher that four members of Fatah al-Islam gunned down legislator Pierre Gemayel on Nov. 21 in east Beirut's suburb of Jdaideh, according to the daily al-Moustaqbal.
Another pan Arab daily, al-Sharq al-Awsat, published a similar report.
The report said Merie testified to Mezher during interrogation that he was the "liaison officer" between Fatah al-Islam's leader Shaker Abssi and Shawkat.
Shawkat, according to Merie's alleged testimony, provided Fatah al-Islam with a "highly qualified explosives expert who trained members of the group on bomb making."
Shawkat also provided the group with "significant support," the nature of which was not reported.
Merie was also quoted as telling Mezher that he worked out the explosives expert's safe exit from the Nahr al-Bared camp in north Lebanon and back to Syria before the clashes broke out between the terrorists and the Lebanese Army on May 20.
The newspaper report quoted unidentified judicial sources as saying Merie identified four members of the Fatah al-Islam network who carried out the Gemayel murder.
The sources, however, refused to disclose names of the suspects.
Nevertheless, the newspaper said the so-called Majd el-Dine Abboud, who also goes by the code name of Abu Yezen, was one of the suspects in the Gemayel murder. He was killed in confrontations with the Lebanese Army.
It couldn't be determined whether Abboud was a Syrian or Palestinian citizen, the report noted.
Merie and his brother, Mohammed, also testified in separate sessions that Fatah al-Islam had planned to carry out bomb and booby-trapped car attacks against several targets in Lebanon, including two Beirut hotels frequented by personnel of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in addition to some embassies and U.N. offices, the report added.
It said Merie testified to playing a role in smuggling Iraqi, Tunisian and Saudi "jihadists" to Lebanon via Syria.
Such Jihadists included Fatah al-Islam financial backer, a Saudi named Abdul Rahman al-Yahya, who goes by the code name of Abu Talha.
Merie, according to the report, rented an apartment for Yahya in the northern city of Tripoli and "received from him lots of money used to finance members of the group and for the purchase of a highly sophisticated machine used to forge passports … which was confiscated later at one of the squad's apartments in Tripoli."
Merie, the report added, moved to the Akkar province after outbreak of clashes at Nahr al-Bared and stayed for a couple of days with a relative. He then moved to the eastern Bekaa valley before settling at the hotel in Beirut's district of Ashrafiyeh where he was busted by police and arrested.
"He maintained contact throughout that period with Abssi and his gang," the report concluded.
Beirut, 18 Jul 07, 17:07
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
Algunos medios recogían ayer esta crónica según la cual los cascos azules van escoltados por Hizbulah, lo que sería algo absolutamente incompatible con el espíritu y la letra de la Res. 1701. Que se sepa, el Minisdef no ha desmentido todavía la información. Esto se suma a otros informes no desmentidos relacionados con los contactos unilaterales y al margen de la cadena de mando de UNIFIL entre los españoles y Hizbulah.
http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDe ... px?ID=6852Blue helmet blues
Is UNIFIL’s mission being compromised by efforts to protect its troops?
Nicholas Blanford
When Master Corporal Fabio Corleone patrols the narrow dusty roads of South Lebanon in his lightly armored Puma troop carrier, he cannot help but dwell on the fate of six peacekeeping colleagues killed in a car bomb last month.
"Yes, I think about it, we all do," the Italian soldier said, moments before leading an armored patrol of eight soldiers along the Lebanon-Israel border.
Like every rock was a potential bomb to Israeli troops occupying South Lebanon in the 1990s, so every parked car on the side of the road now spells potential death for the troops serving with the 13,500-strong United Nations peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL. These fears were once again justified on Monday, when a small bomb targeted a UNIFIL military police vehicle at Qasimiyeh, 10 kilometers north of Tyre.
It wasn't supposed to be like this.
When UNIFIL's strength was boosted nearly a year ago from a caretaker force of 2,000 armed observers, the main concern was the reaction of Hezbollah, which emerged from the month-long war with Israel claiming a "divine victory."
The UN gave assurances that the new UNIFIL would be a "robust" force with several leading European countries dispatching crack troops and armor to give it teeth and credibility. Still, it was principally for show – the last thing the governments of the troop-contributing states desired was for their soldiers to take on Hezbollah or Israel.
It became evident early on that Hezbollah was choosing not to confront UNIFIL and would grudgingly accept UN Resolution 1701 which helped end the fighting. Instead, Hezbollah abandoned its positions and bunkers in the UNIFIL area and regrouped to a new line of defense north of the Litani river.
Certainly, Hezbollah men remain in the villages where they live and keep a close eye on UNIFIL, especially the European contingents with their reconnaissance drones and heavy armored vehicles.
UNIFIL sources say that patrols are occasionally followed by civilians in cars or on foot. Sometimes, these individuals take photographs of the soldiers, although there have been no incidents of violence between them.
As Lebanon's political crisis began to worsen after the war, worrying signals emerge that UNIFIL could be a tempting target for al-Qaeda or groups inspired by Osama bin Laden. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's number two, referred to UNIFIL twice in speeches, claiming that the "international crusader forces" were blocking the "mujahadeen" from reaching the border to fight Israel.
The emergence of Fatah al-Islam and its two-month confrontation with the Lebanese army also heightened the fear of attack on UNIFIL.
The expected attack finally came on June 24, when a Spanish BMR armored vehicle was hit by a bomb packed inside a Renault Rapide parked on the side of the road.
A military source familiar with the investigation into the bombing said that the attack was very carefully planned and the perpetrators would have spent weeks, possibly months, in preparation. The location of the bomb ambush – on a north-south road running just west of Khiam – was selected for its numerous line-of-sight opportunities. From the high ground flanking the valley on both sides, the triggerman would have had a clear view of the targeted vehicle as it approached the car bomb. Furthermore, it is a religiously mixed area of Christian, Druze and Shia towns where Hezbollah’s pervasive grip is weaker than in purely Shia districts where the arrival of strangers is quickly noted.
Investigators believe that the bomb, which was configured to direct the blast laterally against the target, weighed as much as 60 kilograms of military grade explosive (one source thinks it was closer to 100 kilograms) packed with aluminum powder to augment the fireball effect. The blast spun the 14 ton, six-wheeler BMR armored vehicle 180 degrees and knocked it off the road, igniting ammunition inside the vehicle and fuel canisters tied to the outside. Six soldiers were killed in the explosion, although two others, who had been standing through the rear turrets, were thrown clear by the blast and miraculously survived.
According to the military source, the bomb ambush was a "real accomplishment" similar to some car bombs used recently in Afghanistan. It was the work of experienced and technically proficient bomb makers, the source said.
Still, the first attack came as no surprise given the mounting intelligence of threats against the force. Just two days before the deadly bombing, UNIFIL received a warning of a possible suicide bomber targeting its headquarters in Naqoura.
Although al-Qaeda did not take responsibility for the attack – no one has yet – Zawahiri did praise the bombing in a taped statement released last week.
The only good news, perhaps, for UNIFIL in all this is that the sophistication of the bomb and planning that went into the operation suggests that attacks of this magnitude won’t be a common occurrence. However, Monday’s explosion, though much smaller, indicates that a sustained bombing campaign against the peacekeepers is underway.
A troubling consequence of this heightened threat to UNIFIL by radical jihadi groups is that some of the troop-contributing countries have begun turning to Hezbollah, hoping to enlist the cooperation of the Shia group in protecting their soldiers. UNIFIL contingents are not supposed to have any direct contact with Hezbollah – or any other Lebanese political groups – as their official channel of communication is through the Lebanese army.
"It's highly forbidden," said Major General Claudio Graziano, UNIFIL's commander. "I have a relationship with the [Lebanese] government through the Lebanese army. I have no relations with Hezbollah in terms of security."
Still, three months ago, intelligence agents from France, Italy and Spain met with Hezbollah representatives in Saida. As a result of that meeting, some Spanish UNIFIL patrols are now "escorted" by Hezbollah militants in cars. Following last month's bombing, Spanish UNIFIL officers met with local Hezbollah officials, according to a South Lebanon-based party official.
But in fact, there is nothing new about UNIFIL's liaison channels with Hezbollah. When the Shia group began to consolidate its presence in South Lebanon in the late 1980s – and clashed several times with UNIFIL – discreet contacts were made between the peacekeepers and Hezbollah to reduce misunderstandings and hostility. That arrangement continued and strengthened during the 1990s. Hezbollah liaison officers were regularly invited to attend UNIFIL medal parades.
Timur Goksel, who served with UNIFIL from 1979-2003, said in an interview published in the current edition of the Journal of Palestine Studies, that "one of the inherent weakness of any multi-national command – which is always worse in a UN command – is that the contingents make local deals with the forces on the ground, without telling headquarters.”
A year on from their arrival, it seems that the new contributors to UNIFIL are learning that peacekeeping in Lebanon is as much about nuance, compromise and dialogue as displaying a "robust" military presence with tanks and armored vehicles.
However, they would do well to keep in mind a final piece of advice from Goksel: “These [deals] always come back to haunt you.”
Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based journalist and author of "Killing Mr. Lebanon – The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East."
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.