operaciones clandestinas PMC

[Loopster]

Iba a colgarlo, pero es que se han hecho eco decenas de medios y todos dicen más o menos lo mismo... sin profundizar en el tema que a mí personalmente me interesaría, que es quién y cómo gestiona a esos CTPT

Por cierto, re-confirmo lo de gente de XPG en zona española, me han pasado un par de fotos de un convoy nuestro en Lithium.

[Loopster]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/co ... 41_pf.html

U.S. covert paramilitary presence in Afghanistan much larger than thought

By Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller - Washington Post Staff Writers : Wednesday, September 22, 2010; 10:47 PM

On an Afghan ridge 7,800 feet above sea level, about four miles from Pakistan, stands a mud-brick fortress nicknamed the Alamo. It is officially dubbed Firebase Lilley, and it is a nerve center in the covert war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The CIA has relied on Lilley, part of a constellation of agency bases across Afghanistan, as a hub to train and deploy a well-armed 3,000-member Afghan paramilitary force collectively known as Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams. In addition to being used for surveillance, raids and combat operations in Afghanistan, the teams are crucial to the United States' secret war in Pakistan, according to current and former U.S. officials.

The existence of the teams is disclosed in "Obama's Wars," a forthcoming book by longtime Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward. But, more broadly, interviews with sources familiar with the CIA's operations, as well as a review of the database of 76,000 classified U.S. military field reports posted last month by the Web site WikiLeaks, reveal an agency that has a significantly larger covert paramilitary presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan than previously known.

The operations are particularly sensitive in Pakistan, a refuge for senior Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders where U.S. units are officially prohibited from conducting missions.

The WikiLeaks reports, which cover the escalation of the Afghan insurgency from 2004 until the end of 2009, include many descriptions of the activities of the "OGA" and "Afghan OGA" forces. OGA, which stands for "other government agency," is generally used as a reference to the CIA.

In clipped and coded language, the field logs provide glimpses into the kinds of operations undertaken by the CIA and its Afghan paramilitary units along the Pakistani border. In addition to accounts of snatch-and-grab operations targeting insurgent leaders, the logs contain casualtyreports from battles with the Taliban, summaries of electronic intercepts of enemy communications and hints of the heavy firepower at the CIA's disposal.

The CIA declined to comment on the Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams. A Pakistani official said the government will not comment on Woodward's book until after it is released.

A U.S. official familiar with the operations, speaking on the condition of anonymity, described the teams as "one of the best Afghan fighting forces," adding that they have made "major contributions to stability and security."

The official said that the teams' primary mission is to improve security in Afghanistan and that they do not engage in "lethal action" when crossing into Pakistan. Their cross-border missions are "designed exclusively for intelligence collection," the official said.

In addition to Firebase Lilley, in Paktika province, the WikiLeaks logs reveal the existence of an "OGA compound"at Forward Operating Base Orgun-E, another U.S. military installation in Paktika.

The field reports show that casualties are common for Afghan paramilitary forces training and operating there.

On Oct. 6, 2009, for example, an "OGA-trained" fighter was ambushed near Orgun-E while off duty, according to one log; he was treated on the base for gunshot wounds to the face, lower leg and hand.

The logs also indicate that the CIA and its Afghan units are at times involved in heavy fighting, in contrast to long-standing perceptions that the agency has largely served to direct attacks carried out by U.S. Special Operations forces or conventional military units.

On Aug. 11, 2008, U.S. soldiers stationed at Firebase Lilley reported that insurgents were targeting the base with rocket fire, a common occurrence. The soldiers responded at first with counterfire but then paused because of the "OGA dropping bombs," including three 500-pound explosives, according to an Army field report. The counterattack apparently worked, as no casualties were reported.

According to the logs, CIA forces also have mortars in their arsenal. On at least one occasion, in March 2008, the CIA used 81-millimeter rockets to repel an attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman, the same compound that a Jordanian suicide bomber later targeted in Dec. 30, 2009, killing seven CIA operatives. Chapman is in Khost province, also near the Pakistani border.

The agency's paramilitary wing, known as the Special Activities Division, has been active in Afghanistan since the U.S.-backed effort to oust the Taliban government began in 2001. But current and former U.S. intelligence officials said that the CIA almost immediately began assembling an elite Afghan commando force that has expanded in scale and mission over the past nine years.

A former senior CIA official involved in the formation of the Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams said the first unit was created in Kabul shortly after the U.S.-backed invasion in 2001. The team based in the capital remains the largest and most sophisticated, and it is routinely used to carry out operations elsewhere in the country, the former official said.

Over the past eight years, however, new units have been created in other locations, including Kandahar. Their missions vary from sensitive intelligence-gathering operations to carefully orchestrated takedowns of Taliban targets.

When intelligence indicates a Taliban or al-Qaeda presence in a nearby village, the teams often make the first move. "You might knock on the door. You might ask a neighbor. Or you might raid the place," the former official said.

Most of the teams are trained in Afghanistan by CIA and U.S. Special Operations forces. "Unlike the Afghan army, these guys are fairly well paid, very well motivated," the former official said.

The Army field reports suggest that the Afghan paramilitary forces can also be ruthless. On Oct. 23, 2007, military personnel at Orgun-E reported treating a 30-year-old Afghan man for the "traumatic amputation of fingers" on his left hand. The patient had been "injured by Afghan OGA during a home breach," according to the report.

The CIA has been running operations for several years from its eastern Afghan bases, which generally are shared with U.S. Special Operations forces and other military units. U.S. officials said that the CIA and the military frequently use different names for the same base and that the agency code names do not necessarily correspond with those used in the WikiLeaks records.

In October 2003, two Americans working on contract for the CIA were killed near a U.S. military outpost in the Shkin Valley in Paktika province. The outpost, then known as Firebase Shkin, was renamed in 2007 to honor Master Sgt. Arthur L. Lilley, a U.S. Special Forces soldier who was killed in a firefight there.

The CIA has also used the border bases to build and manage networks of ethnic Pashtun informants who cross into Pakistan's tribal belt. In combination with near-constant surveillance from U.S. drone aircraft in the skies, the informants have enabled the CIA to identify the whereabouts of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.

That has led to an exponential increase in missile attacks by the drones. The CIA has carried out 71 drone strikes in Pakistani territory this year, more than double the number for all of 2008, according to statistics compiled by the New America Foundation.

At the same time, the border-hugging bases have reduced the CIA's dependence on Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, a mercurial spy service that has helped track down dozens of al-Qaeda and other insurgent leaders but is also considered a secret supporter of the Afghan Taliban.

For years, the ISI restricted CIA operatives to Pakistani bases in the tribal belt and strictly controlled access to its sources in the region. As a result, the Americans were kept largely in the dark about the presence of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces on that side of the border.

whitlockc@washpost.com millergreg@washpost.com
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

[kapy-ranger-]

Estos dias los acontecimientos en Libia han lanzado algunas ofertas de trabajitos por la zona..., mucha desinformación y solicitud de planes de emergencia para ya mismo,jeje (mala forma de empezar cualquier posible trabajo y un cero a los super directores de seguridad de alguna empresas que ni siquiera contemplaban situaciones de crisis y unos planes decentes de evacuacion para su gente...eso si, estaban en sus puestos bien recomendados y cobrando una pasta, como siempre typical spanish...)total que a la hora final muy pocos contratos reales, pero aquellos que han hehco alguna incursion por la zona se han visto en aprietos con contratistas en el "bando contrario", me refiero a los "afrikaners" contratados por Gadafi... Animo a los mas puestos en el tema a poner algunos post mencionando a estos y otros cuantos contratistas en otras zonas por culpa de los cuales a veces la linea entre mercenarios y contratistas no queda bien definida y eso es un lastre para los que se mantienen dentro de una etica de trabajo (y eso a veces cuesta dinero por no aceptar algunos trabajitos...)para hacer que el sector se vaya abriendo meritoriamente en paises como el nuestro donde sigue monopolizado el tema (y el mejor ejemplo la operacion chanchullo atunera...)

[kilo009]

Aunque esto en principio no son acciones clandestinas de PMC's, y la actuación de los mercenarios libios tendría un tema mejor en el área de Crimen Organizado, mi respuesta es la siguiente, yo básicamente lo distinguiría entre:

Acción legal: Contratista
Acción ilegal: Mercenario

La primera se basa en un contrato legal, por un gobierno legítimo, actuando de acuerdo a las leyes internas del país, las impuestas por la parte contratante y la legalidad internacional. Los segundos, los mercenarios, actúan en contra de la legalidad internacional, aún siendo contratados por gobiernos reconocidos. Si un contratista hace una acción ilegal, se salta las bases de su contrato, puede ser juzgado y se puede romper el contrato.

Ya se ha comentado algo en otros Foros, lee por ejemplo a Loopster y Canario en el Foro FAS:
http://www.boards2go.com/boards/board.c ... 7&user=fas

Por cierto, los nuestros hablan de trabajo ejemplar la actuación de Repsol y 0 en la del MAEC.

[Loopster]

HAVE DARFUR REBELS JOINED QADDAFI’S MERCENARY DEFENDERS?

A handful of unconfirmed reports from Libya have cited the presence of Darfur rebels in the ranks of the African mercenaries defending the regime of President Mu’ammar Qaddafi (al-Intibaha [Khartoum], February 21; Reuters, February 22). A spokesman for the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a press gathering that authorities were investigating the claims (Sudan Tribune, February 22). Darfur has strong historical ties to Libya, its northern neighbor, and Qaddafi has played a large role in hosting peace talks and encouraging the unification of Darfur’s many rebel groups. Perhaps mindful of his own future, Qaddafi has also been one of the main defenders of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir from possible arrest and prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes in Darfur, using his influence in the African Union to pressure other African leaders on the issue, many of whom are also mindful of the precedent that could be set by al-Bashir’s prosecution.

Officials of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the strongest of Darfur's rebel movements, reacted with anger to the allegations, saying JEM has no fighters in Libya, has no interest in interfering with Libyan affairs and will hold Khartoum responsible for any harm that comes to the thousands of Sudanese citizens working in Libya (Sudan Tribune, February 22). When a Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesman later announced that his ministry now had proof (as of yet undisclosed) that Darfur rebels were engaged in the fighting in Libya, JEM official al-Tahir al-Feki responded: “These allegations are very offensive and show no sensitivity towards the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who reside in Libya who will be put in jeopardy as being seen as mercenaries or taking sides. To say that there are JEM fighters in Libya fighting for Gaddafi, this is just provoking the Libyans to go after all the Sudanese” (Reuters, February 23). There are an estimated half million Sudanese living in Libya and Sudanese officials say they are working on an evacuation plan should that prove necessary (SUNA [Khartoum], February 21).

JEM's leader, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, has been harbored in Libya since May 2010, when he was refused re-entry to Chad, JEM’s former base (Sudan Tribune, May 19, 2010). The relocation was the result of a peace agreement between Chad and Sudan that ended a long-running proxy war across the Chad-Sudan border (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, October 28, 2010). Khartoum was extremely displeased with the Libyan decision to offer the JEM leader refuge and it would not be surprising to see Sudanese officials taking the opportunity to try and discredit JEM by linking its fighters to the mercenaries firing on civilians in Libya.

There is something of a precedent here; JEM rebels were active in the defense of their Chadian host when Chadian rebels operating out of Darfur attacked the Chadian capital of N’Djamena in February 2008. There were different circumstances at work, however; JEM stood to lose their Chadian bases if a Sudanese-backed faction took power in Sudan. There were also tribal ties between the Chadian leadership and the leadership of JEM, both of which are dominated by members of the cross-border Zaghawa tribe. In this context, however, it should also be mentioned that the Chadian rebels were Zaghawa as well (see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 30, 2010). A number of Zaghawa are believed to have served in Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion in the 1990s.

As the protesters grow in strength, suspected mercenaries are being dealt summary justice in the streets, often through hanging. Growing numbers of suspected mercenaries are also being detained by revolutionary committees, including alleged gunmen from Chad, Niger and Sudan (Reuters, February 24). Libya has a substantial black African work force and student population that are likely to come under suspicion in the chaotic events engulfing that nation. As mercenaries in Libya come to realize they are both expendable and unlikely to be paid, they will likely use violent and unpredictable means to extricate themselves from the situation.

The reported use of mercenaries in a desperate attempt by Qaddafi’s regime to retain power in Libya is threatening to blow up into a pan-African scandal. It is difficult to believe that gunmen with military experience were hired and flown out of various African nations without the knowledge of security services in those countries, suggesting some African governments have cooperated with the plan or at the very least looked the other way. The issue has been raised in the parliaments of Kenya and Zimbabwe, with the defense minister of the latter nation skirting the question by saying he had “no mandate in my duty as Minister of Defense to investigate activities happening in another African country” (News Day [Harare], February 23; Daily Nation [Nairobi], February 23).

[Loopster]

Confirmada la presencia de PMCs en Libia ahora mismo.

Dos americanas, una muy vinculada a la CIA y otra con experiencia demostrada en convertir milicias en fuerzas de combate efectivas.
Una francesa que no se sabe donde termina la empresa y empieza el DGSE.
Una británica protegiendo inversiones que quedaron abandonadas.
Y una registrada en un país árabe, con personal de pasaporte africano.

Y los rebeldes haciendo declaraciones de "Ojalá pudieramos contratar a Blackwater" según informa un periodists estadounidense.

[Josuebe]

nuevas oportunidades de trabajooo !!!!

[pcaspeq]

Supongo que aunque para muchos es una realidad conocida hace tiempo, me da la sensacion que de la manera que van a enfocar el conflicto libio va a acabar siendo "la salida del armario de las PMCs"; los gobiernos aprobaran el envio de armas a los rebeldes con instructores oficiales y las PMCs van a realizar el trabajo sucio, incluido tal vez la eliminacion de algun personaje no interesante en el bando rebelde.
Como se ha comentado en muchas ocasiones, el tema de las PMCs para el publico en general, le suena a mercenarios y aunque se vinculen a ciertos paises, nunca esta nada claro y no acaba de afectar en sobremanera a la opinion popular, tan necesaria para el politico.

[kilo009]

Es que es un terreno un poco complicado:

-Posibilidad 1: PMC's actuando contratadas por los rebeldes... no son Gobierno reconocido ante organismos internacionales salvo por algún país.
-Posibilidad 2: PMC's entrenando fuerzas rebeldes pero contratados por una agencia de inteligencia... bueno... la responsabilidad también es del contratante, pero a ver como se demuestra.

Seguramente haya muchas más posibilidades, pero es la segunda la que más correcta me parecería en todo caso, contrata un país y no unos rebeldes, es decir, ya tiene algo más de seriedad el asunto. Y a poder ser siempre que haya un respaldo internacional, ahora mismo la ONU lo único que dice es proteger a civiles, no especifica el bando.

[FlancoSur]

Determinadas empresas "serias" no se meten en lugares sin la aprobación tácita del ministerio de exteriores pertinente y es la mejor forma de mantener las apariencias. Si estuviera aprobada por la ONU la participación de tropas en el terreno no habría que recurrir a estos métodos.