Terrorismo en Paquistan
Moderadores: Mod. 2, Mod. 5, Mod. 1, Mod. 4, Mod. 3
Por eso te lo decía. Veteranos del SSG entrenan a talibanes, aunque también es verdad que uno de sus mejores comandantes murió en el asalto a la mezquita Roja. Quizás hubiesen ganado más acudiendo a la FIA u agencias antiterroristas civiles. El papel del ISI y las unidades de OEs que tradicionalmente se les han asignado es muy complejo, por decirlo de alguna forma.
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
Por lo que se comenta, el fiarse de los militares pakistanies era necesario para asegurar el aislamiento de la zona y preparar puntos de emboscada por las posibles vias de escape (en lugar de otro Tora Bora), se barajaron el emplear a las unidades paramilitares tipo Guardia de Fronteras, o incluso a la Guardia Presidencial y la unidad que vigila el arsenal nuclear pakistaní, pero -sin saber si era el SSG concretamente- si que eran militares.
La cancelación no hizo ninguna gracia a las unidades de OEs americanas, estaban en plena vendetta tras la carnicería que habían sufrido en Robert's Ridge y con un cabreo de narices por el fiasco de Tora Bora.
La cancelación no hizo ninguna gracia a las unidades de OEs americanas, estaban en plena vendetta tras la carnicería que habían sufrido en Robert's Ridge y con un cabreo de narices por el fiasco de Tora Bora.
Cry havoc and unleash the hawgs of war - Otatsiihtaissiiststakio piksi makamo ta psswia
Tomado de La Razón
Reunión Bush-Karzai
EE UU atacará a terroristas en Pakistán si tiene información real sobre los objetivos
Efe - Washington-
El presidente de EEUU, George Bush, ha dicho hoy que su país lanzará ataques contra terroristas en Pakistán si tuviera datos de inteligencia sobre un posible objetivo.
«Con inteligencia real sobre la que podamos actuar, haríamos el trabajo», dijo Bush, quien aseguró que a Pakistán también le interesa neutralizar a los terroristas, pero no aclaró si EEUU actuaría sin consultar con el Gobierno de ese país.
La situación en el cinturón tribal es muy preocupante. Según algunos informes en al menos 29 campos de entrenamiento de terroristas se ha detectado que sus operativos han abandonado las instalaciones para dirigirse a zonas interiores de Paquistán. Los líderes talibanes han dejado de ser vistos, y la mayor parte de los distritos del cinturón tribal están en manos de los talibanes, y hay preocupación por la seguridad del arsenal nuclear.
Se estima que Musharraf tiene bajo control a los altos mandos militares, que en cierta medida son compañeros de éste, pero los mandos intermedios e inferiores pertenecen a generaciones jóvenes que nada tienen que ver con el dirigente paquistaní.
Zonas en rojo: controladas por los talibanes
Zonas en violeta: virtualmente controladas por los talibanes
Zonas en amarillo: zonas controladas por los talibanes
Este es un fragmento del análisis del Asia Times
Se estima que Musharraf tiene bajo control a los altos mandos militares, que en cierta medida son compañeros de éste, pero los mandos intermedios e inferiores pertenecen a generaciones jóvenes que nada tienen que ver con el dirigente paquistaní.
Zonas en rojo: controladas por los talibanes
Zonas en violeta: virtualmente controladas por los talibanes
Zonas en amarillo: zonas controladas por los talibanes
Este es un fragmento del análisis del Asia Times
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IH11Df01.html...The new battlefield
The al-Qaeda leadership (shura) has apparently now installed itself in Jani Khel village in the Bannu district of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). This includes Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The Taliban leadership, most prominently Haqqani, is concentrated in the Afghan provinces of Khost and Gardez, where much fighting is expected to take place.
A spillover of al-Qaeda's presence in Jani Khel is likely to spread to Karak, Kohat, Tank, Laki Marwat and Dera Ismail Khan in Pakistan.
Kohat in NWFP is tipped to become a central city in the upcoming battle, as the office of the Pakistani Garrison commanding officer is there and all operations will be directed through this area. In addition, Kohat is directly linked with a US airfield in Khost for supplies and logistics.
A second war corridor is expected to be in the Waziristans, the Khyber Agency, the Kurram Agency, Bajaur Agency, Dir, Mohmand Agency and Chitral in Pakistan and Nanagarhar, Kunar and Nooristan in Afghanistan.
The fiercest battleground, however, will be in Khost and Gardez, making the previous Taliban successes in Helmand and Kandahar during the spring offensive of 2006 a distant memory.
The Taliban's evolution
The death in May of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah in Afghanistan during a coalition raid set in motion a major change within the Taliban's command structure.
The loss of the heroic commander was a huge blow for the Taliban in southwestern Afghanistan, as a major symbol of success had been killed - and there was no one of his stature to replace him, as another top Taliban commander, Mullah Akhtar Osmani, had earlier been killed in Helmand.
Amid the demoralization, the entire Taliban leadership left Helmand, Urzgan, Zabul and Kandahar and sat idle in Satellite Town in Quetta, Pakistan, for several weeks.
Finally, in June, Taliban leader Mullah Omar outlined new guidelines, which included:
No members of the central military command would work in southwestern Afghanistan.
Group commanders would be given control of specific districts and be allowed to develop their own strategy.
This strategy would be passed on only to the Taliban-appointed "governor" of the area, who in turn would relay it to the Taliban's central command council. From these various inputs, the council would develop a broader strategy for particular regions.
The Taliban would discourage personality cults like Dadullah's, as the death of a "hero" demoralized his followers.
Four spokesmen were appointed to decentralize the Taliban's media-information wing. Each spokesman would look after only a specific zone so that in case of his arrest, only information about that zone could be leaked. They also have all been given the same name, at present it is Qari Yousuf Ahmedi.
This "unschooled" program produced results within weeks as the Taliban gained new ground in Helmand and Urzgan through widespread grassroots support, and Jalaluddin Haqqani's commanders gained prominence...
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
Primer documento tipo los FM de las FAS USA. Es el primer manual de campo para operaciones militares producido por los talibanes para sus combatientes. Es del Daily Telegraph
How to be a jihadi: Taliban's training secrets
By Isambard Wilkinson in Islamabad and Ashraf Ali in Peshawar
Last Updated: 1:26am BST 16/08/2007
The manual gives instructions on how to use different weapons
The Taliban has published its first military field manual detailing how to spring ambushes, run spies and conduct an insurgency against coalition forces in Afghanistan.
At 144 pages, Military Teachings - for the Preparation of Mujahideen, is a minutely detailed "how to" book on subjects ranging from tactics and weapons to building training camps and spycraft.
The guide, which is similar in its aims to British and American military field manuals, was obtained by The Daily Telegraph from a source in Pakistan who claimed to be close to the Taliban. Its cover bears the image of two crossed swords and the Koran, the arms of the Taliban's ousted government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
The book, written in the Pashto language, "will soon be made available to the commanders in Afghanistan as well as its adjacent tribal areas in Pakistan", the source said. He added that copies of the manual had been circulated to the Pakistani tribal area of Bajaur. Its publication highlights the extent of the Taliban's revival six years after it was deposed by a US-led invasion.
"This is the first of its kind and shows a significant level of organisation," said Brigadier Mahmood Shah, a retired military intelligence officer who was in charge of security in the tribal areas.
Brig Shah said "soft" Pakistani government policy towards the pro-Taliban militants had allowed them to flourish in the lawless ethnic Pashtun tribal areas that straddle the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Maulana Nek Zaman, an MP from North Waziristan, where security forces and local pro-Taliban militants are engaged in daily skirmishes, said the manual had a potentially large readership. "It is not a case of just Taliban who are fighting but all the tribes are resisting because they have been attacked," he said.
Last year the Taliban published a pocket-sized code of conduct which described suicide bombers as "Omar's missiles", referring to the Taliban's spiritual leader, Mullah Omar. It laid out the rules of daily life including a ban on relations with young boys - an activity favoured by some Afghan fighters.
The military manual is divided into 10 chapters and appears to be the result of a collaboration between religious scholars and specialists in terrorist, logistical and intelligence tactics. It is illustrated with simple formulas for the preparation of explosives, pictures and diagrams of light and heavy weaponry, ammunition and communication equipment.
The bulk of the manual details basic military skills such as firing positions and how to use different weapons. It advises on how to carry out remotely controlled attacks on enemy vehicles, and shows how to strike aircraft and armoured vehicles by targeting weak points.
It shows with diagrams how to target vehicles passing through rough terrain at low speed and how telegraph poles and trees can be used to range in on a target.
It also explores methods of blowing up bridges, railway tracks and power and telephone lines.
Its preface sets out the Taliban's justification for war: "In a situation where infidels and their crooks are ruling the world, it is the prime duty of all the Muslims to take arms and crush those who are bent upon crushing the Muslims throughout the world.
"This is the best time to take on the usurpers and occupants of our holy land. They should be killed, slaughtered and destroyed."
It sets out to convince women and children to join the Taliban with verses from the Koran.
"In this situation the children are not bound to seek the permission of their parents; a woman should go to jihad without the permission of her husband, a slave without the permission of his master, a student without the permission of his teacher, could go to jihad. And this is totally applicable in the prevailing situation where the infidels have occupied the land of the Muslims in Afghanistan," it states.
It addresses the question of prosecuting jihad without one's ruler's permission, making a veiled reference to Pakistan's president, Gen Pervez Musharraf, and the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. "Islam does not allow a person, group or an entity to announce jihad, without the permission of the ruler of the day (Khalifa)." However, it states "if a Khalifa is a puppet of the infidels, then there is no need to seek his permission for jihad."
The manual also plays on the heightened Pashtun sense of virility. "Jihad is a man's job. Those lacking qualities of being a man cannot do jihad."
Military students are advised to run spy networks drawn from political prisoners, "criminals, especially murderers", beggars, hairdressers and "international visitors - players, filmmakers, artists etc".
"Is it fair to slaughter enemy spies?" it asks. The answer it gives, perhaps unsurprisingly, is yes.
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.
Continuando con el tema de los niños adoctrinados como sangrientos yihadistas, nuevo vídeo donde un crío de 1 años decapita a un soldado paquistaní.
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArti ... bcontinentBoy shown beheading Pakistani soldier in video
(AFP)
27 August 2007
DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan - Pro-Taleban militants have released a video of an apparently teenage boy beheading one of 16 Pakistani soldiers kidnapped in a restive tribal area bordering Afghanistan.
The gruesome recording, a copy of which was obtained by AFP, will likely put further pressure on embattled US ally President Pervez Musharraf to crack down on Islamist violence in the frontier region.
The 35-minute video entitled ‘Revenge’ first shows the 16 soldiers, all of them in uniform, who were taken hostage on August 9 in the South Waziristan tribal district.
Four teenage boys with Kalashnikov assault rifles, daggers and headbands with jihadi slogans are then shown along with one of the soldiers kneeling in front of them.
One boy cuts off the soldier’s head using a knife and holds it up for the camera. The soldier’s body was recovered on August 14 from a nearby town.
The video shows the victim saying just before his death that ‘security forces should not fight against the Taleban’.
The Pakistani military strongly condemned the video, saying it had not seen the recording but was aware of its existence.
‘It proves that they are terrorists. It is an act contrary to tribal customs and is also a cowardly act to kill an unarmed human being,’ chief military spokesman Major General Waheed Arshad said.
Negotiations are still underway to free the remaining soldiers as well as a Pakistani military officer and three other officials who were kidnapped in South Waziristan on Friday.
Pakistan has been hit by a wave of Islamist bloodshed since last month’s siege of the extremist Red Mosque in the capital in which more than 100 people died, most of them militants.
La necesidad permite lo prohibido.