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Publicado: 19 May 2007 15:06
por Esteban
Y es que a Musharraf le crecen los enanos. Está aumentando la tensión militar entre el gobierno afganos y los paquistaníes, tras los recientes incidentes entre unidades de ambos paises, y la confusa reunión del otro día donde murieron soldados y agentes USA, oficialmente por acción de unos incontrolados. Los paquistanies quieren vallar la famosa línea Durand, diseñada por los brits en 1893 para defender la India de las belicosas tribus afganas. Ni que decir tiene que esta línea fronteriza es rechazada por los afganos. Y no es poco el odio a los vecinos paquistaníes y al ISI.

El link http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 811094.ece

Armamento: India

Publicado: 01 Feb 2008 01:55
por OSLO
La india se dispone ha adquirir ocho aviones de lucha antisubmarina Boeing P-8i en sustitución de los aparatos rusos TU-142M en servicio operacional. El aparato de fabricación estadounidense fue reconocido como el mejor en su clase y las partes están afinando los detalles del contrato. La transacción de casi dos mil millones de dólares promete pasar a ser la más importante en la historia de la cooperación militar entre EE.UU. y la India.

Lo dificil se hace, lo imposible se hará.

Publicado: 01 Feb 2008 02:06
por OSLO
En los ultimos ocho años la India gastó 25 mil millones de dólares en la compra de armamento y material, y se dispone a gastar 30 mil millones de 2007 a 2012. Los principales socios de la India en el ámbito militar son Rusia, Israel y Francia.

Lo dificil se hace, lo imposible se hará.

Publicado: 08 Feb 2008 05:34
por OSLO
La India proyecta comprar 317 helicópteros para renovar la flota de su Ejército y Fuerza Aérea, con una inversión estimada en 2.500 millones de dólares, informó el ministro de Defensa A.K. Antony.
Tras la cancelación el año pasado del pedido de 197 aparatos a Eurocopter, el ministro dijo que la compra es "urgente" por lo que el proceso será agilizado, ya que tienen que renovar la vieja flota de Cheetahs que opera desde la década de 1960.
El Ejército indio también tiene prevista la adquisición de 126 aviones de combate, con una inversión prevista de 10.000 millones de dólares.

Lo dificil se hace, lo imposible se hará.


Publicado: 19 Mar 2008 17:09
por OSLO
El primero de los cazas embarcados Mig-29K, a instalar en el portaaviones "Almirante Gorshkov" que Rusia va modernizando para India, se va a traspasar a la parte hindú en mayo próximo, reveló el viernes Surish Mehta, jefe del Estado Mayor de la Armada hindú.

Se contempla que Rusia entregará a la Armada hindú 16 cazas embarcados, incluidos 12 aviones de combate y 4 aviones de instrucción y combate.

Lo dificil se hace, lo imposible se hará.


Publicado: 19 Mar 2008 18:23
por OSLO
Rusia transferirá novedosas tecnologías aeronáuticas a la India si ésta compra cazas rusos Mig-35.

Si la India opta por los novísimos aviones Mig-35, la parte rusa le transferirá las tecnologías aprovechadas en ese modelo, incluídas las de quinta generación, y también será elevado el nivel de cooperación con la industria india.

La cooperación "Mig" participa en el concurso convocado por el Gobierno de la India para comprar 126 cazas para la Fuerza Aérea del país. El precio del contrato podría superar los 10.000 millones de dólares.

Lo dificil se hace, lo imposible se hará.

Publicado: 28 Jun 2008 21:44
por kilo009
Artículo de la Fundación Jamestown

Military Operations in FATA: Eliminating Terrorism or Preventing the Balkanization of Pakistan?

By Tariq Mahmud Ashraf

Ever since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the radical turnaround in Pakistan’s policy toward the Taliban, there has been an ongoing debate in Pakistan over whether President Pervez Musharraf has gone too far in supporting the U.S.-sponsored War on Terrorism. The popular sentiment against Musharraf has been unequivocally demonstrated by the result of the February 18 general elections where his political supporters suffered an abject defeat. While there is enough evidence to substantiate Musharraf’s compulsion in supporting the United States, it is equally important not to lose sight of the importance the War on Terrorism has for Pakistan’s national interests.

The recent events in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) indicate the imperative for Pakistan to quell the resurgence of militant extremist elements. An objective view of the current situation in FATA reveals several similarities between the situation there and that which prevailed in erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971. It has been over three and a half decades since Lt. Gen. Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi of the Pakistan Army, along with 93,000 servicemen, surrendered to Lt. Gen. Jagjit Singh Aurora, the commander of the Indian and Bangladeshi Forces, marking the fall of East Pakistan’s provincial capital city of Dhaka and the creation of the independent country of Bangladesh out of the former eastern wing of Pakistan. A comparison of the situation that existed in East Pakistan prior to that fateful day in December 1971 with what is happening today in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) exposes several worrying similarities between the two [1].

Ever since the Pakistan Army ventured into FATA in its quest to uproot the alleged al-Qaeda elements operating there, there have been numerous incidents of civilian casualties. Some of these have come as a result of the army’s operations while others have been the result of increased attacks by missile-equipped Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operated by the CIA and the U.S. military. The situation in FATA is now growing alarmingly similar to that which prevailed in erstwhile East Pakistan after the March 1971 crackdown by the Pakistan Army. The latest in the spate of such incidents has been the virtual destruction of the town of Spinkai in South Waziristan by the Pakistan Army’s 14th Division, resulting in a large number of casualties and the displacement of over 200,000 people (Dawn [Karachi], May 10).

The unique geographic disposition of the two wings of Pakistan when the country came into being in 1947 saw the two segregated parts growing further apart with the passage of time. Notwithstanding the fact that they outnumbered the West Pakistanis, the inhabitants of East Pakistan were justifiably aggrieved at being treated like second class citizens in a country that they had equally struggled for. Nowhere was this unjust treatment more obvious than in the government services, especially the military. Until as late as 1965, the Pakistan Army had only one battalion from East Pakistan, the East Bengal Regiment (EBR), and even this unit was commanded by a mix of officers from the Eastern and the Western wings of Pakistan [2].

A similar scheme was implemented for the paramilitary forces. Just like the Pakistan Rangers and the Frontier Corps in West Pakistan, the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) was established in East Pakistan. Once again, while the soldiers and other ranks were from East Pakistan, a sizeable number of the regular army officers assigned to the EPR formations came from West Pakistan. The realization that the East Pakistanis were poorly and inadequately represented in the country’s army led to four additional battalions of the East Bengal Regiment being raised immediately after the 1965 war, but this gesture was “too little and too late” [3].

This lack of integration within the military between the personnel from the two wings of the country and the gross disparity in numbers in favor of personnel hailing from West Pakistan were factors that would play a crucial role during the 1971 war. When hostilities broke out, the first action of the Bengali soldiers in the EBR and EPR units was to exterminate their West Pakistani officers and assume control of the weapons and equipment available in their units. From here on, neutralizing other pro-West Pakistan entities and joining hands with the invading Indian Army and the local militants from the Mukti Bahini (the Bengali “Liberation Army”) was basically just a logical progression of events. The specter of the native-dominated Frontier Corps undertaking similar action in FATA is a frightening possibility.

In comparing the situation and the military strategy employed by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan and that now being employed in FATA, one must not lose sight of the cultural and societal differences between the East Bengali Muslims and the tribal Pashtuns. While the former are a normally docile, hard-working and peace-loving group who seldom resort to militancy and the use of weapons, the latter open their eyes every day in a world that revolves around weapons and militancy. From this perspective, the manner in which the situation was handled in East Pakistan and the way that it is being handled in FATA have to be different in order to be effective. Whereas in East Pakistan, the Pakistani military had trained only a limited number of local inhabitants in the use of weapons and the art of warfare, the adversary in FATA is already well versed in these areas and has experience combat fighting against the Russians during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As such, the adversary that the Pakistan Army confronts in FATA is a trained and seasoned combatant who also has the significant advantage of belonging to the region and being totally familiar with its topography and terrain. The suspected presence of seasoned foreign militants in this region further compounds the issue.

Traditionally, the role of maintaining security in FATA has been assigned to the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary outfit very similar in composition to the EPR. Like the EPR formations, the entire junior manpower of the Frontier Corps is recruited from local tribesmen with the entire officer cadre coming from the regular Pakistan Army. Since the Pakistan Army’s officer cadre is fairly well integrated at the national level, a sizeable number of these officers hail from provinces other than the NWFP—most notably from the Punjab.

The Frontier Corps is a legacy of British rule. In order to maintain a semblance of control over the hostile and militant natives of this region, the British opted to employ the locals as soldiers and placed British officers in command of these formations. Rather than being an externally focused outfit responding to aggression from across the border, the Frontier Corps was designed more as an internal security force with the prime objective of maintaining law and order in the volatile tribal belt and ensuring the safety of all strategic communication routes (see Terrorism Monitor, March 29, 2007). The deployment and disposition of the Frontier Corps has changed only slightly since the British era. Most of the outposts and garrisons of the Frontier Corps are located in areas through which strategic communication routes pass or in areas where tribesmen could be expected to become unruly and need to be controlled by force.

Ever since Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, successive governments in Islamabad have tended to leave FATA alone, with no concerted efforts being made to integrate this area into Pakistan. This is borne out by the fact that the tribal areas did not have adult franchise until 1996, nor do the Pakistan Police have any authority to enter and operate inside FATA. As was the case during British colonial rule, law and order in the tribal areas continues to be governed by the decades-old Frontier Crimes Regulations, which have yet to be replaced by the Pakistan Penal Code that applies elsewhere throughout the country.

Due to its proximity to Afghanistan and the porous and indefensible nature of the terrain, Pakistan’s tribal belt became the hub of training for the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Apart from leading to the influx of enormous amounts of military hardware and weaponry into the region, this period also led to the arrival of numerous Islamic militants from other parts of the world. Many of these foreigners stayed behind after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan and assimilated into the local tribes by marrying local women and settling down.

An analysis of the current situation in FATA reveals several stark similarities between what is happening in FATA today and what happened in East Pakistan during the period leading to the creation of Bangladesh:

• Just as East Pakistan had the EPR and the EBR formations manned entirely by locals but commanded by outsiders, the Frontier Corps, which is the main security organ in FATA, is also manned entirely by local manpower at the junior levels but has officers from the Pakistan Army who do not necessarily belong to the same province.

• Similar to the lack of integration among military personnel belonging to East and West Pakistan that was evident in 1971, there have been no efforts to integrate the almost 80,000 local tribesmen who have joined the ranks of the Frontier Corps with the regular Pakistan Army.

• While the Bengali militants found willing supporters across the border in India, the tribesmen of FATA have a strong affinity and cultural, ethnic, social, religious and linguistic ties with the natives inhabiting Afghanistan’s border regions with Pakistan. Though it is understandable that no significant military support might be forthcoming from this quarter as long as U.S. and NATO forces are waging the war against the Taliban inside Afghanistan, logistical support and safe havens / refuge would definitely be available for Pakistani tribesmen fleeing across the border into Afghanistan.

• With the entire Frontier Corps of almost 80,000 local natives commanded by a handful of officers who happen to be outsiders, a recurrence of native troops turning against their officers (as in East Pakistan) is a possibility in FATA.

• Just as the EPR and EBR had their sympathies with the local inhabitants of East Pakistan, the personnel of the Frontier Corps have very strong societal and familial links with the tribesmen of FATA since these personnel belong to the same tribes. This is probably the main reason why so many of these soldiers have opted to surrender to the militants rather than fight against them during the past few months.

• Similar to East Pakistan, where a sizeable number of Hindus with obvious sympathy for neighboring India lived within its territory, the tribal belt has a significant number of foreign Islamic extremist elements who cannot ever contemplate returning to homelands where they have been declared offenders to public order. Having assimilated themselves into the local tribal system of life, these individuals are bound to resist any efforts by Pakistan’s military to actively disrupt the freedom of action that they have become accustomed to.

• Like the situation that prevailed in East Pakistan where the neighboring Indians had never truly reconciled themselves to the creation of Pakistan, the Afghans have also never really accepted the legality of the Durand Line—an arbitrary frontier delineated by the British more than a century ago [4].


It appears that the Pakistan Army has neither learned nor assimilated the lessons of 1971 since it appears to be bent upon repeating the same mistakes. In order to prevent any further break-up of Pakistan it is imperative that these issues be addressed immediately.

The Pakistani government and its military are faced with a difficult scenario in the country’s northwestern regions that border Afghanistan. The geography of this region, its peculiar socio-cultural ethos and the historical traditions of its inhabitants require that the emerging situation in these areas be handled differently. In this context, it would be prudent for the military in Pakistan to review the lessons it learned during the 1971 East Pakistan crisis so as to not repeat the mistakes that led to the defeat of 1971. Whereas FATA’s geographic contiguity with the rest of Pakistan presents an entirely different scenario from what the country was faced with the geographically distinct East Pakistan, it must be considered whether the situation in FATA needs to be handled through the employment of military force or whether other options are available.

Considering that a substantial number of U.S. and NATO troops are likely to remain engaged against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for at least the foreseeable future, an early return of peace and stability to Pakistan’s tribal areas would have a significant positive impact on anti-Taliban operations in Afghanistan. As such, the achievement of stability in the northwestern territories of Pakistan should be a joint priority for the Pakistani military as well as for the foreign forces engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom inside Afghanistan.

It must also be kept in mind that if Pakistan plans to exploit its access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea by acting as a gateway for the trade of the resource-rich Central Asian states, it is vital that Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas be stabilized as early as possible. Since the opening up of these strategic land trade routes would be beneficial for all the stake holders, it is in everyone’s interest to work toward the goal of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While there is no doubt that fighting the extremist militant elements in FATA is important, as is supporting the global War on Terrorism, Pakistan’s military must contemplate whether these efforts are more important than the very existence of Pakistan as a viable nation-state. Pakistan must, therefore, consider the war against the militant extremists operating from inside FATA as a war for its own existence and stability rather than an operation being undertaken at the behest of the United States and the West. If this conviction is spread within the disillusioned elements of Pakistan’s population, the government might possibly continue the ongoing War against Terrorism in a more efficient, forceful and effective manner.


1. Apart from the author’s personal knowledge and experience of having lived and gained early education in East Pakistan prior to the 1971 creation of Bangladesh, the author’s late father and his father-in-law were both officers in the Pakistan Army and served in various capacities in the EBR and the EPR for over two decades each. As such, this article relies largely on the personal knowledge of the author and his family members.

2. The author’s late father was one of the Company Commanders in No. 1 EBR which served on the Bedian front near Lahore during the 1965 war. Manned entirely by Bengali soldiers, NCOs and JCOs, the unit at that time had a mix of officers from East and West Pakistan.

3. In his last assignment in East Pakistan, the author’s late father served as the Second-in-Command of No. 5 Battalion of the EBR, then stationed in the northern city of Rangpur.

4. See Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, “The Durand Line: Pakistan's Next Trouble Spot,” Asian Affairs, January 2004

Cazas embarcados MIG-29K

Publicado: 27 Oct 2008 03:19
por OSLO
Rusia empezará a suministrar cazas embarcados MIG a la India en primavera de 2009 , comunicó el director de ventas de la corporación rusa "MIG", Mijail Globenko. Los primeros cuatro aviones MIG-29K serán entregados en la primavera que viene y los 12 restantes, en otoño.

Ya ha comenzado la instrucción de los pilotos indios que durará unos cinco meses. En cuanto a los técnicos e ingenieros, ya se encuentran en Rusia desde hace dos meses.

Lo difícil se hace, lo imposible se hará.

Re: Pakistán-independentistas-control de regiones

Publicado: 01 Mar 2009 20:33
por fyc
Se podría comentar aquí como las autoridades de Pakistán están ceciendo a las presiones de los Talibanes a cambio de que cesen sus acciones militares. En algunas zonas Pakistán es claramente un estado fallido.

Re: Pakistán-independentistas-control de regiones

Publicado: 04 Mar 2009 03:08
por Komet
Uff, este tema me toca de cerca. Me gustaría comentar unas cosillas al respecto.

Para empezar, como ya sabreis, el tema de fondo comienza, en teoría, con la partición. Los britanicos, aplicando la acertada máxima "divide y vencerás" no hicieron esta "marca en la arena" caprichosamente (como si puede ser interpretada, entre comillas, la "decimonovena provincia de Irak", Kuwait). Fue un acto calculado que ha tenido sus consecuencias positivas y negativas.

Por un lado, Pakistan es un pais artificial. Fue creado, en principio, como un territorio refugio para la "minoría" musulmana de la India. Su mismo nombre es un acrónimo: PAKISTAN (Punjab Afganhia Kashmir Indo-Sindh y beluchiSTAN). Se ha querido ver en su nombre una similitud al vocablo en urdu que significa pureza aunque un analisis simple permite ver que es una manipulación. Por otro lado, el vocablo pakistan en su derivativo se asimila al significado en idioma persa de pureza pero sólo el lenguaje sindhi mantiene su similitud caligráfica con el persa por lo que es probable que sólo sea una "afortunada coincidencia" provocada, dada la represión sufridas por los sindhis.

La creación del estado de manera artificial tuvo una doble problemática: por un lado las migraciones de hindues al sur y de musulmanes al norte seguidos por desordenes civiles generalizados, etc; por otro lado, la partición de provincias de manera fragmentada.

Las provincias fragmentadas tradicionalmente indias, como el Sindh y el Punjab, no supusieron mayor problema. El Sindh tradicionalmente ha estado expuesto a oleadas de emigración como resultado de su cuestión histórica y, por tanto, una más casi que no contaba (por poner un ejemplo, la gran mayoría de las tiendas "de indios" que hay por toda España son de sindhis que, por ejemplo, consiguen buenos precios en electronica porque tienen primos, hermanos u otros familiares en Hong Kong, China, Filipinas y demás). Por la parte del Punjab, no tenían problema puesto que tradicionalmente son el "pueblo fuerte" de las etnias de la India. Prueba de esto es que la mayoría de los cargos militares y sus oficios son ocupados por punjabis. En Pakistan, coexisten los tradicionalistas sij con los punjabis que, por cierto, profesan su religión, de tradición hinduista, y nadie se mete con ellos. Mientras que la provincia Punjba de Pakistan ha permanecido, mas o menos, pacifica, el estado Punjab en la India ha pujado por la independencia en numerosas ocasiones incluso con resultados sangrientos.

Prueba del respeto al "guerrero" sij y punjabi es que en Inglaterra, existe una división de policías bobbies punjabies que en lugar del tradicional casco llevan su turbante.

La provincia fragmentada de Kashmir es objeto de litigio y ya hay otro tema del foro hablando de este particular.

Por otro lado, respecto a las provincias de Afghania, denominados genericamente como territorios del norte (o fronteras del Norte, divididas en dos segmentos) son, desde su creación, un elemento artificial y principal coladero de Pakistan de activistas en la reciente invasión de afganistán. Además son conocidos hervideros de actividad de Al Qaeda. Su adscripsción administrativa a Pakistán se debe puramente a las maniobras expansionistas y de conquistas del Imperio Británico en su tiempo.

Respecto a Beluchistan, se puede decir lo mismo que las provincias de Afghania con la añadidura de una dura pugna política de los poderes locales con el estado central que ha derivado en más de un asesinato político.

Así estan las cosas. Por tanto, aunque es un pais de mayoría musulmana (situandose el porcentaje, diga lo que diga la Wikipedia porque hablo con conocimiento de causa, en el 75% de la población, que no es poco, pero tampoco es el 100%), la minoría fundamentalista es la que ocupa las posiciones de gobierno, lo cual pone al pais como esta, bajo sospecha absoluta (y con razón, en mi humilde opinión).

Para mejor entendimiento de la componenda, véase cualquier lista de cargos del ISI y si se consigue encontrar un apellido punjabi, el afortunado se lleva un premio.